
MEADE 




THE LIBRARY *1789 


Book 


Wvvy v 

















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ADVERTISEMENT. 


THE reader must not expect to find the following 
pages filled with recriminations against the French 
people and their ruler. I leave it to the consistency of 
those who have been uniformly hostile to the cause 
of rational liberty, and the constitutional rights of 
the subject in this country, to abuse the despotism 
of France. 

It is to my countrymen, and not to our adversaries, 
that I wish to address myself; to call upon them by 
every motive that can actuate good men and good 
subjects, to attend, at this momentous crisis, to their 
own real interests; to dissipate those exaggerated 
apprehensions which seem likely to plunge us into 
the very evils which they dread; to awaken the people 
to a just sense of the importance of the great cause 
of political morality ; to remind them that the faults 
of the government are the faults of the people ; the 
honour of the nation their honour, and the disgrace 
of the nation their disgrace; and to induce them to 
feel, that the conscience of a nation is in the bosom 
of every honest man. 


Allerton, 8th Jan. 1808. 





























A 




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Y •* 


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CONSIDERATIONS, &c. 


OINCE the unsuccessful issue of the negotiations for 
peace with France in the year 1806 , a series of events, 
equally unexpected and important, has awakened this coun- 
try to a more lively sense of its situation, and brought on 
a new crisis of public opinion. The experience of another 
year of warfare has been added to those which preceded it, 
and has shown not only the futility of all attempts on our 
part to overturn or diminish the power of France, but the 
high probability that all such attempts will still continue to 
produce effects directly the reverse of those intended. In 
fact, it is only since the rupture of that negotiation, that the 
operation of the war is become more directly injurious to 
the commercial interests of this country. Until that period, 
an intercourse subsisted between Great Britain and the 
continent, sufficient to carry off our manufactures, and to 
give employment to our traders ; but the unhappy contests 
between France and the northern powers, and above all 
our late attack upon Denmark, have afforded our enemies 
an opportunity of excluding us from every port in Europe, 
and have placed the key of the continent in the hands of 
Bonaparte. These circumstances, added to the threatening 
aspect of public affairs, have at length excited the dormant 
feelings of the people ; and a suspicion, not wholly ground- 


10 


that prospect of retaliation, which, during the continuance 
of the war, they had never ceased to indulge. Another, 
and a still more formidable party, consisted of' the innu- 
merable bands of journalists and hireling writers, who feed 
upon the credulity and fatten upon the calamities of a na- 
tion; men who flourish most in the midst of tumult; to 
whom the disasters of the country are as valuable as her 
triumphs, a destructive battle as a rich harvest, and a new 
war as a freehold estate. Nor was the number small of 
those who having been accustomed to derive their emolu- 
ments from the continuance of the war through the end- 
less ramifications of office, place , and pension , or by the 
more lucrative means of contracts with government , were 
thoroughly dissatisfied with the pacification, and looked 
anxiously forward towards fresh causes of disagreement.. 
The united efforts of these irreconcilable enemies to the 
general tranquillity were not without effect. Their reite- 
rated clamors appeared like the public voice. Scarcely 
were the preliminaries of the treaty concluded, when new 
grounds of hostility were discovered; every provocation 
that could excite the dormant passions, was incessantly 
called forth ; and the same ministers who had concluded 
the peace, were loudly required to break a treaty which 
they could not disavow, and to cut the gordian knot . In- 
stead of endeavouring to heal the wounds of war, by a con- 
ciliatory conduct towards the French people and govern- 
ment, the English press continued to pour forth against 
them the most unrestrained abuse; and by these means the 
combustibles were prepared for a new explosion. 

That the disagreement between the two countries, 
which soon afterwards led to fresh hostilities, had no 
foundation in any unavoidable or substantial cause, may 


% 


11 

sufficiently appear from attending to the manner in which 
the discussion commenced and was conducted by the op- 
posing parties. Some impediments had indeed arisen, as 
to the evacuation of Egypt and Malta by the English 
troops, and the evacuation of Holland by the French, but 
these difficulties appeared to be capable of explanation, 
and were in a course of being effectually removed, when 
a representation on the part of the French government, 
by its envoy, M. Otto, called the attention of ministers 
to a serious complaint. The subject of this representation 
was not any fresh obstacle to the execution of the treaty' 
of Amiens, or any new aggression on the part of the go- 
vernment of this country against France, but was confined 
to the improper conduct of the French emigrants in this 
country ; the abusive publications against the government 
of France , which daily issued from the press , and particu- 
larly to a passage contained in one of the numbers of Pel- 
tier's Journal .* 

In reply, lord Hawkesbury informed M. Otto, that it 
u was impossible that his majesty's government could peruse 
u the article complained of without the greatest displea - 
u suref and assured him that it should be referred to his 
majesty’s attorney-general. f Nor does it appear, that at 
this period any recrimination was made by the British 
ministry, on account of publications of a similar tendency^ 
in France. Under these circumstances the subject rested 
from the 28 th of July to the 17 th of August, when the 

* Letter of M. Otto, July 25th, 1802. 

f M. Peltier, the author of the article, was accordingly pro- 
secuted, and convicted of a libel; but the war taking place 
was never brought up for judgment. 


French minister, in a formal memorial, entered more fully 
into the subject, contending, “-that it was not a question 
w respecting some paragraphs inadvertently inserted in a 
u public print, but was a question of a deep and continued 
“ system of defamation, directed, not only against the 
u chief of the French republic, but against all the consti - 
u tuted authorities and the whole nation , represented by 
u these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms ; 
“ and that it had even been remarked, that many of these 
u prints contained an appeal to the French people against 
u the government and fundamental laivs of their country .” 
He further represented, that, w by the first article of the 
u treaty of Amiens, the two powers had agreed to afford no 
“protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who 
u should cause prejudice to any of them;” and reminded 
the British ministry, u that whatever might be the protec- 
u tion which the English laws afforded to native writers, 
“ the ministry were enabled, by the alien act, to compel 
w foreigners , whose residence was prejudicial to the inte - 
“ rests of Great Britain , to quit the kingdom.”* The an- 
swer of lord Hawkesbury admitted, “ that very improper 
“ paragraphs had appeared in some of the English news- 
u papers, against the government of France; and that it 
“ could not be denied likewise, that publications of a still 
“ more improper and indecent nature had made their ap- 
“ pearance in this country;” but he now contended, that, 
“ as the French government had thought fit to resort to 
“ recrimination, or, at least, to authorize it in others, they 
“ could have no right to complain if their subsequent ap- 
“ peal to his majesty had failed of effect.” To the remark 
of M. Otto, respecting the dismission of foreigners from 


Memorial of M. Otto, Aug. 17 , 1802 . 


13 


the kingdom, lord Hawkesbury replied, 44 that the pro- 
u visions of the act referred to, were made for the purpose 
M of preventing the residence of foreigners, whose num- 
u bers and principles had a tendency to disturb the inter- 
u nal peace of these dominions ; but that it did not follow 
“ that it would be a warrantable application of such a law, 
w to exert its powers in the cases of the individuals com- 
a plained of, who were liable to be prosecuted under the 
44 law of the land, in like manner as others had been in 
44 similar cases, at the instance of foreign governments.”* 
How far these reasonings may be logically just, or politi- 
cally expedient, it is not now of importance to inquire ; 
but they demonstrate that the disagreement arose from 
publications in this country, which ministers themselves 
admitted to be indecent and improper; and that the pub- 
lications in France were by way of recrimination. The 
discussion was afterwards carried on between the. French 
ministry and the British ambassador in France, but with- 
out producing any satisfactory consequences. On the con- 
trary, lord Whitworth informed M. Talleyrand, in ex- 
press terms, u That until the first consul could so far 
u master his feelings as to be as indifferent to the scurrility 
44 of the English prints as the English government was to 
44 that which daily appeared in France , the state of irrita- 
44 tion zvas irremediable .”f 

To this observation Talleyrand appears to have made no 
reply ; but to have proceeded with great solemnity to in- 
quire, 44 What were his majesty's intentions with respect 

* Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, Aug. 28, 1802. 

t Letter of lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, Jan. 27, 
4803. 


14 


to the evacuation of Malta;” a subject, which, for upwards 
of six months, appears to have been entirely at rest. This 
inquiry his lordship transmitted to the British ministry, 
and the answer of lord Hawkesbury affords a new proof 
of the importance attached, as well by the government of 
this country as by that of France, to injurious language 
and false aspersions. After taking a review of the acquisi- 
tions made by France since the signing of the preliminary 
articles of peace, and contending “ that his majesty 
u would have been warranted, consistently with the spirit 
u of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisi- 
u tions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power 
u of France ,” he declares, “that his majesty was willing 
“ to have waived the pretensions he might have a right to 
“ advance, of this nature, and have carried the treaty into 
“ effect, had not the very extraordinary publication of the 
“ report of col. Sebastiani attracted the attention of his 
w majesty’s government. That this report contained the 
u most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against the 
u officer xvho commanded the British forces in Egypt , and 
“ against the British army in that quarter; insinuations 
u and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as 
u would warrant his majesty in demanding that satisfac- 
M tion, which on occasions of this nature^ independent 
“ powers in a state of amity have a right to expect from 
“ each other. That this, which was the report of an accre- 
“ dited agent, disclosed views in the highest degree injuri- 
“ ous to the interests of his majesty’s dominions, and ut- 
“ terly inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the treaty 
“ of peace.”* 


* Lord Hawkesbury to lord Whitworth, Feb. 9, 1803. 


15 


This communication immediately led the way to the 
very extraordinary interview between lord Whitworth 
and the first consul, which will long be remembered as a 
unique proceeding in diplomacy. The French ruler, after 
lamenting, w as a matter of infinite disappointment to him, 
a that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by 
“ conciliation and friendship, had been productive only of 
“ continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust,” enume- 
rated the several provocations which he had received from 
England. In the first rank he placed “the non-evacu- 
“ ation, by the British government, of Malta, and Alexan- 
“ dria, as they were bound to do by treaty,” and declared* 
“ that no consideration on earth should make him acqui- 
“ esce ; and that of the two he would rather see the English 
“ in possession of the fauxbourg St. Antoine than of Mal- 
“ ta.” Fie then adverted to “ the abuse thrown out against 
“ him in the English public prints ; but this, he said, he 
“ did not so much regard, as that which appeared in the 
“ French papers published in London. This he consider- 
“ ed as much more mischievous, since it was meant to in- 
“ cite the people of France against him and his government. 
“ He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against Eng- 
“ land increased daily; because every wind which blexv from 
“ England brought nothing but enmity and hatred against 
“ him. France, he observed, had an army of 480,000 men, 
“ to be immediately completed, and all ready for the most 
“ desperate enterprises. England had a fleet that made 
“her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he 
“ should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such 
“ countries, by a proper understanding, might govern the 
“ world ; but by their strifes might overturn it. Fie said, 
“ that if he had not felt the enmity of the British go- 
“ vernjnent on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, 


16 


“ there would have been nothing that he would not have 
u done to prove his desire to conciliate ; participation in 
u indemnities as well as in influence on the continent ; 
“ treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have 
“ given satisfaction and testified his friendship. Nothing 
w however had been able to conquer the hatred of the 
“ British government; and that therefore it was now come 
“ to the point, whether we were td have peace or war. 
“To preserve peace, the treaty of Afniens must be fulfilled; 
“ the abuse in the public prints, if hot totally suppressed, 
“ at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English 
u papers ; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest 
u enemies (Georges and others) must be withdrawn. If 
“ war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to 
iC fulfil the treaty.” To these and many other observa- 
tions of the first consul, lord Whitworth very justly re- 
plied, that, “ after a war of such long duration, so full of 
“ rancor, and carried on in a manner of which history had 
“ no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree 
u of agitation should still prevail; but that this, like the swell 
“ after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by 
“ the policy of either party. That he would not pretend to 
“ pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper 
“ war, and which was still kept up, though with this differ- 
“ ence, that in England it was independent of the govem- 
“ ment, and in France its very act and deed.”* 

From this interview it sufficiently appears that whatever 
might be the subject of discussion, one principal cause of 
difference and of exasperation was the abusive publications 
on each side of the water, upon the priority of which lord 

* Lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, Feb. 21, 1803. 


17 


Whitworth did not think it expedient to pronounce. It cer- 
tainly also appears, that the previous admonition of the 
British ambassador to the first consul, had not been with- 
out effect ; as he freely consents to submit to a reasonable 
portion of abuse, provided it were in English. But it is of 
much more importance to observe the idea which the 
French ruler professed to entertain of the relative position 
and the different interests of France and of this country; 
an idea which seems, either inadvertently or intentionally, 
to have been passed over without the slightest notice ; but 
which, if it had been attended to and improved upon, 
might not only have given peace to Europe, but have 
placed Great Britain beyond the reach of danger from any 
power on earth. If peace had been the object of the Brit- 
ish ministry, here was the ground work of it ; if security , 
here was the season for finding it; if aggrandisement , this 
was the opportunity for obtaining it. In an arrangement 
upon these grounds, this country would have made no sa- 
crifices. To have increased her maritime resources, ex- 
tended her commerce, preserved the general tranquillity, 
and even retained on the continent that influence which 
her honour and dignity required, might have been the re- 
sult of a temperate discussion of the points referred to by 
the first consul. But what was the answer of the British 
ministry ? A total silence on these most important and 
interesting topics ; and instead of a reply to them, a new 
reference to all the existing causes of dissatisfaction, the 
complaints of the French government respecting the licen- 
tiousness of the English press ; the report of Sebastiani ; 
the resolution of his majesty not to evacuate Malta without 
arrangement ; and fresh complaints respecting 

C 


some new 


18 


the conduct of the French government toxvards Turkey.* 
In the mean time an expression in an expose of the state 
of the French nation, laid before the legislative body, in 
which the reporter insultingly asserted, that England alone 
could not contend with France , inflamed the resentment of 
the British nation to the highest pitch ; and the man who 
would have dared to have treated the expression with the 
contempt it deserved, would have been deemed a traitor t© 
his country. 

In that indignant feeling which repels with just de- 
fiance, the arrogance of self-assumed superiority, I hope I 
shall always participate with my country. But when we 
complain of a national affront, it is incumbent on us to ex- 
amine whether our own conduct may not have given rise to 
it. If for this purpose we recal the tenor of the publications 
which then disgraced the British press, we shall find suffi- 
cient cause to suspect, that whatever may have been the 
insolence of the French, we have been at least their equals, 
either in the ascending degrees of arrogance and presump- 
tion, or the degrading scale of low and vulgar abuse. Un- 
der these circumstances, it might have been expected that 
we should have borne with patience an expression, evi- 
dently intended, from the time it was pronounced, to in- 
fluence the negotiation, f To this reasoning it may be 
objected, that this hostile sentiment had the sanction of the 
French government, whilst the abuse poured out on this 
side the water, was only the production of unauthorized 
individuals ; but this, although it may be held to be a good 
distinction here, will probably not be considered so by the 

* Lord Hawkesbury to lord Whitworth, Feb. 18, 1803. 

t February 21, 1803. 


19 


rest of Europe. To foreign states, that which a country 
does, or that which it permits to be done by its subjects, is 
the same. With our internal regulations they can have no 
concern; but they have a right to expect from us that re- 
spect for their institutions, which we claim for our own. To 
encroach upon the freedom of the press, will never be the 
act of any real friend to the interests of mankind; but to 
restrain its licentiousness is not to encroach upon, but to 
preserve that freedom. If it be in the power of every venal 
demagogue, or wild enthusiast, to throw out, unrestrained, 
the most unjust and offensive aspersions against the rulers 
and governments of other states, a cause of hostility will 
never be far to seek. In fact, nations, as they are composed 
of, so they feel like individuals, and the general sentiment 
differs from the particular one, only in being more perma- 
nent and more intense. 

On the commencement of the war, it soon appeared that 
the two countries differed so essentially both in national po- 
licy and physical situation, that they were scarcely tangible 
to each other at anyone point. The armies of France, 
collected on the shores of the ocean, and the volunteers of 
Great Britain, continued to breathe defiance against each 
other; but this did not satisfy the eager expectations of the 
partisans of the war, who attributed to the inactivity of the 
ministry that which was the inevitable result of the posture 
of affairs, and ©f the new relations on the continent. Mr. 
Pitt was therefore again called to the direction of the Bri- 
tish cabinet, for the avowed purpose of carrying on the 
war with greater effect. That this was the signal for new 
disasters, was foreseen by every one who was not totally 
insensible to the state of Europe, and to the experience of 
past events. It was to no purpose that the French ruler. 


20 


on assuming the imperial title, in a letter addressed to the 
British sovereign, professed himself ready to enter upon a 
discussion with Great Britain for a pacification. His pro- 
posal was rejected on the pretext that Great Britain must 
first consult her allies . In fact, other views now occupied 
the attention of the minister, who was at that moment em- 
ploying his utmost efforts in exciting the continental pow- 
ers to another attack upon France. For this purpose, the 
British envoys at Petersburg and Vienna were indefatiga- 
ble.* Russia entered with eagerness into the project, and 
Austria, prevailed upon by the representations of the two 
powers, at length consented to become a party. In order 
to give greater effect to the measures of the allied powers, 
the attack upon France was to be as unexpected as it was 
formidable. Terms of accommodation were to be held out 
to which it was certain France would not accede; and u the 
“ Austrian sovereign was to heighten or lower his language 
w as he might be prepared with the means of making good his 
u pretensions .”f The deception , however, as it was very 
properly called by the British ambassador, could notlbe 
carried on beyond the month of August.:): It was to no 

* “ I have in several conversations lately with prince Czarto- 
“ risky and comte Stadion, urged the expediency of losing no 
“ time in beginning war” Lord Gran. Levison Gower to lord 
Mulgrave . Petersburg , 3d Sept. 1805. 

t These are not the words of the author, but of the British 
ambassador at Vienna. See sir Ar. Paget's letter to lord Mul- 
grave, 29th Aug. 1805. 

I “ It was hardly to be expected that the deception could be 
“ carried on beyond the month of August; and this was in fact 
u the epocha at which it ceased.’* Sir Ar. Paget's letter ta 
lord Mulgrave , 24 th Oct. 1805. 


\ 


21 

purpose that the emperor of Austria assured the French am- 
bassador, “ that his views in arming 1 were only to maintain 
“ peace The activity of the British envoys, and the im- 
mense levies of Russian and Austrian troops, would no 
longer admit of concealment; and the French ruler, who 
during this supposed secrecy was probably aware of every 
transaction, declared, u that if he were obliged to repel force 
U ty force, be would not commit the error of waiting for 
u the Russians to form a junction with the Austrians 
u against hirri”\ Compelled to take the field without the 
aid of an ally, and distracted by the jealousy and dissen- 
tions of their commanders, the Austrians opposed but a 
very inadequate barrier to the union and rapidity of the 
French. In the commencement of the conflict, the greater 
part of the Austrian armies were made prisoners, and the 
remainder dispersed. Bonaparte, with unexampled cele- 
rity, passed through the electorate of Wirtemberg, and the 
plains of Nordlingen, whilst general Ney completely cut 
off the communication between the Austrians and Rus- 
sians.^: As the consolidated armies of France approached 
towards Vienna, their progress was irresistible. Advancing 
in detached bodies, the Russian armies attempted in vain 
to repair the misfortunes of the allies. The decisive battle 
of Austerlitz terminated the contest, and the successor of 
the Cesars, driven from his throne, was compelled to ac- 
cept of the terms dictated to him by the conqueror. 


* Sir Ar. Paget to lord Mulgrave, 29th Aug. 1805. 
f Note of M. Talleyrand, 16th Aug. 1805. 
t Sir Ar. Paget to lord Mulgrave, 24th Oct. 1805. 


In the affairs of nations, success has too often been al- 
lowed to varnish over the most unjustifiable purposes; but 
- in the present instance, however laudable the object had 
been, the misconduct and folly of those who had given rise 
to the alliance, and should have combined the operations of 
the war, were such, as must, in the eyes of impartial pos- 
terity, brand them with indelible disgrace. Not only were 
the Austrians compelled to sustain alone the whole power 
of the enemy, but the king of Prussia, with an immense 
military establishment ready for action, and sufficient at 
any moment, in case of a serious contest, to turn the for- 
tunes of the war, was suffered to remain neuter; not even 
bound by the alliance, much less committed to the cause, 
as he ought to have been, by some decisive and overt act.* 
By this primary error, occasioned by a blind confidence 
that the accession of Russia would insure the co-operation 
of Prussia,! the Austrians were exposed to the attack of 
the enemy without support ; the second of the Russian ar- 
mies having been delayed in its march a whole month, by 
Prussia threatening to oppose it.! I n fact, the eagerness of 
the British ministry to hasten forward the attack upon 
France, whilst the two imperial states were disposed to it, 
deprived them of the opportunity of ascertaining the inten- 
tions of Prussia with that precision which the importance 

* See the Treaties between England, Russia, Austria , and 
Sweden , published with observations upon them by Ridgeway, 
1806 , under the title of. Considerations on the late Treaties , 
where the reader will find many acute and judicious remarks 
on those monuments of human folly. 

t Remarks by the cabinet of Petersburg on the plan of ope- 
rations proposed by Austria. 

t Memoir communicated by count Stahrcmberg. 


25 


of the crisis required. The interests of Great Britain and 
her allies were thus committed to the decision of a power, 
on whom the British minister had no sufficient grounds of 
reliance ; and as the Prussian sovereign bestrode the ba- 
lance, he might, in case the contest had been doubtful, 
have inclined the beam to either side, as his feelings or his 
interest directed. The promptitude and rapidity of the 
French ruler deprived him, however, of the opportunity 
of interference ; and with the eyes of all Europe upon him, 
that sovereign stood an inactive spectator of a contest, the 
result of which was manifestly calculated to give him a 
master. This has been sufficiently evinced by subsequent 
events; nor is it certain, that if the efforts of the allies had 
been crowned with success, his situation would have been 
more secure. 

With the battle of Austerlitz, the confederation against 
France terminated, and with that terminated also the po- 
litical career and the life of Mr. Pitt: a statesman to 
whom it would be unjust to deny the endowments of extra- 
ordinary talents, and the praise of having improved those 
talents, in some departments, to a most uncommon degree. 
But these accomplishments, which ought to have render- 
ed him a benefactor to his country, were unfortunately 
subservient to one predominating passion, which not only 
counteracted their good effects, but converted them into 
implements of danger and destruction. This passion he 
inherited from his father, who cherished it in the early 
years of his son, and directed his infant gaze towards that 
eminent station which he had himself once occupied. In 
his education nothing was left undone that could qualify 
him to attain this object; and no one certainly ever entered 
into public life with equal advantages. There is, however, 
an essential difference between those qualities which are 


24 


calculated to obtain power, and those which enable us to 
make a proper use of it. Unfortunately, the system of 
education of Mr. Pitt was, in politics, that which lord 
Chesterfield’s is in private life* It was founded on too 
narrow a basis, and aimed too directly at its object. A 
cultivated mind and a humane disposition will render their 
possessor truly polite ; sound principles and a real love of 
mankind, truly patriotic ; but without these, neither the 
politeness nor the patriotism are any thing more than a 
whited sepulchre. The system was however successful ; 
the young orator began his career in a manner the best cal- 
culated to display his powers. As he spoke the hopes of 
freedom revived ; corruption shrunk before his glance, and 
the nation hailed him as her deliverer ; but no sooner was 
the prize within his grasp, than he seized it with an ea- 
gerness, and retained it with a tenacity, which all the ef- 
forts of his opponents could neither impede nor relax. 
Having thus obtained the supreme power, the talents 
which had acquired it, were employed with equal success 
to preserve it. The correction of abuses, the removal of 
peculation and corruption, the reform of the representation, 
the extension of religious and civil liberty, were now no 
longer the objects in view; or were only recalled at stated 
periods, to show with what dexterity the minister could 
blast his promise without breaking his faith. Well schooled 
in all the routine and arcana of office, an adept in the 
science of finance and taxation, Mr. Pitt’s great accom- 
plishment was a thorough knowledge of the artificial and 
complex machine of government, and his great defect, a 
total insensibility to the feelings of mankind, and a tho- 
rough ignorance of the leading principles of human na- 
ture. Unfortunately for his fame and for his country, new 
situations arose, to which the hackneyed rules of a narrow 


25 


policy were totally inapplicable. A powerful nation, 
whose slavery had for ages been its reproach, threw 
off its shackles, and attempted to form for itself a 
limited monarchy. It was Mr. Pitt’s first misfortune to 
be insensible to the grandeur of so glorious a strug- 
gle; his second, to miscalculate its consequences. The 
first act of France was to hold out her emancipated hands 
to the free states of England and America; but the cold- 
ness of the minister soon convinced her that in this go- 
vernment she was not to expect a friend. That coldness 
soon degenerated into enmity and abhorrence, and through 
every change of circumstance and situation, through all 
the evolutions and forms of her government, whether mo- 
narchical, republican, aristoc rati cal, or despotic, she found 
in him a decided and inflexible enemy. With what success 
his hostility has been attended, impartial history will show. 
Whether the attempt were to march to Paris ; to restore 
the family of Bourbon ; to restrain the French within the 
limits of their own dominion; or, to starve them into subjec- 
tion; in whatever way our enmity has been demonstrated, 
it has failed of its effect. To assert, however, that these 
efforts have failed, is wholly inadequate to the proper 
statement of the fact. They have not only failed of their 
object, but have been the positive and active cause of the 
continued union and consequent triumph of the French 
nation. To what circumstance is it to be attributed, that a 
people so restless in their disposition, so changeful in their 
views, should have been united together through all the 
variations of their government, and have acted in all their 
external relations with one heart, and as one man? To 
what, but the continued pressure of exterior force? To the 
successive combinations formed, under the auspices of Mr. 
Pitt, to compel them to submission? That France has suf- 

D 


2G 


fered in the contest; that her best blood has flowed upon 
the scaffold, that the luminaries of science have been ex- 
tinguished, and the brightest gems of the human intellect 
trampled under foot; that jealousy, ambition, cruelty, and 
revenge, have acted their dreadful parts in awful succes- 
sion, and have produced a scene of calamity unexampled 
in history, is but too true; but such was the price that 
France was compelled, by Europe, to pay for her indepen- 
dence on foreign powers; and in this view the purchase 
was, after all, cheaply made. The principle which carried 
that nation through all her difficulties, was the determina- 
tion of the people to rally round the existing government, 
t whatever that government might be , and to join in repelling, 
with one hand, and one voice, the common enemy. To this 
they have sacrificed their ease, their property, their friends, 
their families, their lives, with a prodigality which excites 
at the same instant admiration and horror. But in this they 
have, as a nation, found their safety. By this they have 
prevented the still more dreadful consequences that must 
have resulted from a civil war, in which one half of the 
nation might have been arrayed in arms against the other, 
and the contending parties might have exposed a depopu- 
lated and bleeding country to be the prey of the first inva- 
der. By this they have disappointed the hopes of those wh© 
presumptuously partitioned out the provinces of France, 
like the kingdom of Poland, and who foresaw no obstacles 
but in the difficulties which might occur in dividing the 
spoil. 

Thus the breach of the treaty of Amiens, incited chiefly 
by the cry of the war party in England, and which was 
ventured upon for no assignable object except the posses- 
sion of the island of Malta, occasioned, in the course of a 
few months, the greatest disaster which the established or- 


derof things in Europe has, in modern tim.es, experienced; 
and led the way to those important changes, the extent of 
which are not perhaps yet fully disclosed. These events, 
which are supposed to have hastened the death of Mr. 
Pitt, struck widi a sudden panic his colleagues in office. 
The reins of government fell from their hands ; a change 
in the administration of the country took place, and the 
union of lord Grenville and Mr. Fox with that of their 
friends, encouraged the hope, not only of a speedy termi- 
nation of hostilities, but of that steady and gradual ame- 
lioration in our domestic concerns, which, without alarm- 
ing the fears of the weak, might satisfy the reasonable 
expectations of the country. Nor was much time suffered 
to elapse before measures were taken for realizing those 
expectations. In the month of February, 1806, an incident 
occurred, that afforded Mr. Fox an opportunity of display- 
ing that character of rectitude and integrity of principle, 
which it is the first duty of every government to adhere to, 
and its chief honour to avow. An unprincipled wretch, 
pretending to be just arrived from France with matters of 
importance to communicate, obtained admission to Mr. 
Fox, and after a short conversation, disclosed to him a 
plan for assassinating the ruler of France with fire-arms, 
from a house which had been hired for that purpose at 
Passy. Shocked at the atrocity of such a proposal, Mr. 
Fox drove the villain from his presence, giving orders at 
the same time to send him out of the kingdom. But not 
satisfied with this proof of his indignation, he wrote to M. 
Talleyrand on the 28th February , giving him an account 
of the whole transaction. The reply of the French minis- 
ter, dated 5th March , conveyed to Mr. Fox the thanks of 
Bonaparte, and an assurance that “ he recognised , in the 
4t conduct of Mr . Fox, those principles of honour and virtue 


28 


u by which he had ever been actuated , and which had already 
u given a new character to the war,” On the same day M. 
Talleyrand transmitted, in another letter to Mr. Fox, an 
extract from a speech of the French ruler to the legislative 
body, in which he openly expresses a wish for a termina- 
tion of hostilities. “ I desire peace” said he, u with En - 
M gland. On my part I shall never delay it for a moment ; / 
u shall always be ready to conclude it , taking for its basis 
u the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens” By this corre- 
spondence the way was prepared for a new negotiation, 
under auspices highly favourable to a reconciliation be- 
tween the two countries. 

It cannot be denied that the conduct of Mr. Fox, in this 
transaction, confers the highest honour on his memory. 
His letter to Talleyrand is to be considered, as Mr. Fox 
himself doubtless considered it, with respect to itself alone, 
and independent of consequences. In giving information 
to the chief of the French government of an attempt to as- 
sassinate him, he had performed an honourable, but an in- 
dispensable duty. Whatever effect it might produce upon 
the mind of Bonaparte was foreign to his object. If it had 
been slighted and contemned, Mr. Fox would never have 
regretted the part he had acted. If it induced that spirit of 
reconciliation which a noble action is so well calculated to 
inspire, the result was natural, and could not be raised on 
a better foundation. Even the political opponents of Mr. 
Fox ought to have felt rightly on such a subject. They 
ought to have known, that it was no effort to his great and 
generous mind to reject the proposals of an avowed assas- 
sin. It is not on this account that he is intitled to our ap- 
plause; but it is because he had the virtue and the courage 
to bring forward into public life, and to exemplify in the 


29 


most striking manner, one of the most important maxims 

of morality, that it is never expedient to do evil in the hope 
of producing an eventual good ; because he could unite the 
speculative virtues of the closet with the public conduct of 
the statesman, and exhibit to the world a noble proof, that 
amidst the rage of national and individual animosity, the 
eternal laws of justice and of virtue were neither over- 
thrown nor shaken. 

In the early stage of the negotiation a discussion had 
arisen between M. Talleyrand and Mr. Fox, whether 
Russia, as an ally of Great Britain, should be considered 
as a party to the treaty, a point upon which Mr. Fox pe* 
remptorily insisted. But whilst this debate continued, 
Mr. d’Oubril the Russian minister thought proper to en* 
ter upon a separate negotiation ; and, notwithstanding the 
remonstrances of the British envoy, to conclude a separate 
peace between Russia and France. This circumstance al- 
though highly displeasing to the British ministry, re^ 
moved one of the principal objections to the treaty for a 
separate peace between France and England; but another 
obstacle then presented itself; and the French ministers 
were required, as a preliminary, to agree to the uti possi- 
detis, or state of actual possession of both countries, as the 
basis of the treaty. Although the negotiation began early 
in March, this proposition appears not to have been ex- 
pressly made to the French ministers until the 24th of 
July, when lord Yarmouth submitted it to general Clarke 
in an official note. It is true it had before been frequently 
adverted to, as the basis of the treaty, in the correspon- 
dence between lord Yarmouth and Mr. Fox; but this was 
the first instance in which it had been specifically proposed 
to the French ministers ; and when proposed, it was ob- 


30 


jected to, as being peculiarly inapplicable to a treaty which 
was wholly to consist of mutual concessions, and in which 
France had already offered to restore to his Britannic ma- 
jesty the electorate of Hanover. 

From the documents relating to the negotiation, as laid 
before parliament, it undoubtedly appears that the idea of 
the uti possidetis being proposed by France as the basis of 
the treaty, was rather a deduction from certain expressions 
of M. Talleyrand than an explicit proposition of such a 
basis. In a discussion between lord Yarmouth and M. 
Talleyrand respecting the occupation of Sicily, which took 
place about the 13th of June, the French minister ob- 
serves w Tou have it; we do not demand it from youf* an 
expression which lord Y armouth, in his letter of that date 
to Mr. Fox, considers as equivalent to the expression, we 
demand nothing from you,\ and as amounting to an admission 
of thexrri possidetis as applicable to his majesty's conquests. 
On this it is obvious to remark, that the language of Tal- 
leyrand appears to have applied only to the island of Sicily; 
whereas the construction of lord Yarmouth renders it a 
general proposition and that it is highly improbable that 

* “ Vous Pavez; nous ne vous la demandons pas.” Letter of 
lord Yarmouth , 13th June, 1806. 

f u JYous ne vous demandons rien .” Ibid. 

I It must however be observed that lord Yarmouth stated in 
his place in the house of commons, that the offer of the uti 
possidetis was more explicitly made, than appears from the 
printed correspondence ; an assertion which no one will there- 
fore dispute ; but which it is to be regretted was not expressly 
and immediately recognised on the part of Great Britain as the 
basis of the treaty. 


31 


Talleyrand would have consented that the uti possidetis . > 
which is a principle of mutual retention, should be appli- 
cable only to his majesty's conquests . The admission of 
this basis was attempted to be further demonstrated from 
a passage in a letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, of 
the 1st of April, in which he informs Mr. Fo s. that the 
emperor desires nothing that England possesses but it 
must be observed that this is not proposed as a basis 
of the treaty; and that so far from being considered, at the 
time, by Mr. Fox in that light, he has not in his reply of 
the 7th of April once adverted to it; but, on the contrary, 
has there recognised another basis, which had originally 
been proposed by himself, viz. that the peace ought to be 
honourable to both countries , to which M. Talleyrand had 
proposed to add, and to their respective allies. On the 2d 
of June M. Talleyrand proposes to establish as a basis two 
fundamental principles. 1. That the two states should have 
for their object that the peace be honourable to them and their 
respective allies , and at the same time to secure as far as in 
their power the future tranquillity of Europe. 2. An ac- 
knowledgment , on the part of the two powers , of their mu- 
tual right of intervention and guarantee in continental and 
maritime affairs. To this Mr. Fox on the 14th of June re- 
plies. The basis offered in' your second proposition is ex- 
actly conformable to the views of our government; provided 
it be well understood that , whilst we mutually u acknowledge 
u our respective rights of intervention and guarantee xvith 
u regard to the affairs of Europe , we also mutually agree 
u to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or les - 
u ser states which compose it .” Thus it appears that during 

* “ L'empereur n’a rien a desirer de ceqiie posse da V An- 

gleterre .* ** 


32 


all this period, the principle of the state of actual possession 
had neither been assented to, nor even proposed, by either 
of the parties; but that on the contrary other principles had 
been laid down and solemnly agreed to as the basis of the 
treaty. The principle of the uti possidetis was, however, 
still unfortunately insisted on by the British ministry, and 
opposed an invincible barrier to the negotiation, till new 
events took place which entirely frustrated the object in 
view. 

No sooner had the treaty of Mr. d’Oubril arrived at 
Petersburg, than the emperor refused to ratify it. This in- 
duced the British ministry to return again to the original 
determination of Mr. Fox, not to negotiate otherwise than 
in conjunction with Russia ; and lord Lauderdale accord- 
ingly informed the French minister, “ That England zvas 
u resolved not to make peace , zvithout obtaining for Russia 
“ ALL THE OBJECTS ON WHICH SHE INSISTED.” Early in 
the discussion M. Talleyrand had explicitly proposed, not 
only to restore Hanover, without any compensation, to his 
majesty, but also to give up Malta and the Cape of Good 
Hope ; at the same time observing, that w Hanover was for 
w the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy , 
“ and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of the British 
“ commerce .” This not having been assented to and ldrd 
Lauderdale having demanded his passports, another pro- 
position was made, still more favourable to the interests of 
this country. In addition to Malta and the Cape, the pos- 
session of Pondicherry, Chandenagore, and their depend 
encies in the East Indies, and the island of Tobago in the 
West. To which were added, as a specific compensation 
for his Sicilian majesty, the Balearic islands, and an annu- 
ity from the court of Spain to enable him to maintain his 


33 


dignity. In order to satisfy the demands of Russia, an of- 
fer was also made to cede to that power the island of Cor- 
fu, in addition to the terms of the treaty concluded with 
Mr. d’Oubril; but this was not deemed satisfactory; and 
the propositions made to the British ambassador were 
therefore wholly rejected; lord Lauderdale at the same 
time expressly declaring, u that he felt himself bound to con - 
“ sider the obtaining for Russia the arrangement < which she 
“ desired , as an object more interesting, if possible, to 
u England , than those points -which might be considered as 
u peculiarly connected -with her own interests 

This unhappy termination of the discussions for peace 
between Great Britain and France, is the more to be re- 
gretted, as it appears that the terms offered separately 
by France to Great Britain, independently considered, 
were such as might have satisfied both the honour of the 
sovereign, and the expectations of the British ministers ; 
but their unalterable determination not to desert our Rus- 
sian ally, prevented such terms from being accepted. If 
any confirmation of this were necessary, it may be found 
in his majesty’s recent declaration in reply to that of 
the emperor of Russia, announcing hostilities against this 
country; in which it is observed, that “ His imperial ma - 
u jesty cannot fail to remember that the last negotiation 

* For a full examination of this negotiation I must refer to 
Mr. Whitbread’s most argumentative and luminous speech on 
that subject, (printed for Ridgeway, 1807 x ) in which the cir- 
cumstances of the discussion are traced with a degree of pre- 
cision, and commented on in a spirit of liberality, which confer 
equal honour on his understanding and his heart; yet the motion 
with which he followed it, was negatived without a division. 
January 5, 1807. 


E 


34 


« betzueen Great Britain and France was broken off upon 
u points immediately effecting, not his majesty’s own 
u interests, but those of his imperial allyF Thus it ap- 
pears that after the close of that negotiation, the war was 
carried on by this country, not for the defence of any ob- 
ject which France wished to wrest from us; not for the 
purpose of eliciting from France terms more advantageous 
than she had already offered; but in order to obtain for 
Russia all that she demanded from France : for Russia, 
who has now effectually released us from all further 
interference on her behalf, and left us to carry on our 
present contest with France, without an ally , without an 
object , and without a cause . 

The result of this negotiation tended in a striking man- 
ner to extinguish, in this country, the hope, and almost the 
very desire of reconciliation. This result was founded on 
the character of those who composed the British ministry 
at that period. Had the same circumstances taken place 
under another administration, it might have been supposed 
that the same spirit of hostility which had given rise to the 
war, and supported it for so many years, still prevailed ; 
and we might have presumed, that a treaty entered upon 
in the spirit of peace, by men less inflamed by passion and 
less prejudiced by habit, might prove successful; but when 
a negotiation begun by Mr. Fox, and the successful result 
of which was stated by him, in his last moments, to be one 
of the two great objects for which he was most anxiously 
solicitous; when such a negotiation fails under the conduct 
of his surviving coadjutors and friends, who declare to the 
country “ that the restoration of the general tranquillity 
u was retarded only by the injustice and ambition of the 
“ enemy,” all expectation of peace is abandoned; and no- 


35 


thing appears to remain for the people, but to unite their 
endeavours in accomplishing the destruction of an implaca- 
ble foe. 

But whatever construction may, in other respects, be put 
upon this negotiation, and however the nation may suffer 
from its consequences, there is one consideration which 
cannot fail to be in the highest degree consolatory; this 
consideration is founded on the undeniable conviction, that 
during the whole course of the negotiation, the British mi- 
nisters never, for one moment, compromised the dignity, 
nor committed the character of the country. Under their 
guidance the British nation not only preserved her faith to 
her ally, but continued it under circumstances which might 
perhaps have afforded her a plausible pretext for abandon- 
ing the connexion. However desirable the restoration of 
his continental dominions might be to his majesty, or the 
establishment of peace and the accession of territory to the 
people, these advantages were relinquished, through an in- 
flexible adherence to our fidelity to our allies ; a circum- 
stance which tended in an eminent degree to diffuse 
through the continent the most implicit confidence in the 
honour and integrity of the British sovereign and nation. 
In the declaration of his majesty on the failure of the ne- 
gotiation, the people are informed, u that all their dearest 
u interests are at stake , that no sacrifices they can 
u -be called on to make, are to be compared to the certain 
“ disgrace and ruin of yielding to the injurious pretensions 
“ of the enemy y If this be considered with respect to Great 
Britain alone, it will be difficult to discover the grounds 
upon which it rests, and indeed it would scarcely be con- 
sistent with the subsequent declaration of his majesty 
against Russia, in which it is explicitly stated, that the con- 


36 


test was continued for interests not his own. But if 
we accede to the principles laid down by the late admini- 
stration, that the treaty with Russia was still obligatory 
upon this country, and consider the demands made by 
France, as calling upon us to sacrifice our faith to our allies 
by the breach of that treaty; in that sense, and in that sense 
only, the assertion may be admitted to be just; inasmuch 
as no sacrifices we can be called on to make are too great, 
for maintaining the character of the nation for honour and 
integrity clear and unimpeached. 

But although the noncompliance on the part of France 
with the demands of Russia might be a sufficient cause of 
hostility between her and Great Britain, yet this is rather 
to be attributed to the unfortunate effects of our having 
formed such an alliance, and to the necessity of adhering 
to it, than to any misconduct on the part of France, which 
could justly widen the breach, or increase the animosity 
between the two countries. In treating with her enemies 
separately for peace, France had broken no engagement. 
In the terms she had offered to Great Britain, she appears 
to have assented to the demands of his majesty’s mi- 
nisters, as far as the interests of this country were con- 
cerned. But we had also to contend for the demands of 
Russia, without whose assent we refused to conclude the 
treaty. What then were those demands ? Were they such 
as Russia ought to have expected, or as France was likely 
to grant? For however we might still remain bound by 
treaty not to conclude a separate peace, yet even this could 
not be supposed to be obligatory upon us, so as to justify 
Russia in demanding unreasonable terms. Between France 
and Great Britain it had been agreed that a compensation 
might be found for Sicily; but when Russia again inter- 


37 


fered in the negotiation, the retention of Sicily again be- 
came a sine qua non. This concession on the part of 
France, was expected to be accompanied also by that of the 
extensive territory of Dalmatia, which had fallen into the 
hands of France in repelling the ill-advised and ill-con- 
ducted attack of the allies, upon her in 1805, and had been 
part of the price paid by the emperor of Austria, at the 
peace of Presburg, for the security of his crown. Let us 
then for a moment ask ourselves, whether it were likely that 
France would relinquish to the dominion of Russia a dis- 
trict which she had thus obtained? and which, from the dis- 
tant situation of his Russian majesty’s imperial dominions, 
could have no possible object but to provide him with an 
additional and formidable point of attack against Turkey, 
and thus to render him the uncontrolled master of the 
east ? a circumstance which if it had occurred, would at 
this moment have been a subject of not less dissatisfaction 
to Great Britain than to France. Even the proposition 
made to Russia by France, to relinquish to her the island 
of Corfu after the emperor had refused to confirm the 
treaty of d’Oubril, was evidently a concession to the inter- 
ference of Great Britain, in the hope that she would prevail 
upon Russia to dispense with her other demands. Whe- 
ther in this instance, the accusation of ambition, rapacity, 
and unbounded thirst of dominion, be more properly ap- 
plied to France or to Ruesia, the impartial reader will 
judge; but the inference to be drawn from it will be still 
the same; that as the noncompliance by France with these 
demands on the part of Russia, was the only reason for 
continuing the war, there exists not, at this moment, when 
those reasons are effectually removed by the avowed hosti- 
lity of Russia to Great Britain, either any just ground of 
offence against France for her conduct in this transaction, 


38 


or any difference of interest between the two countries 
which can now be alleged as a motive for continuing 
the war. 

Whether the French ruler were or were not sincere in 
his professions for peace, I shall not undertake to judge. 
There is, however, one circumstance which strongly fa- 
vours the idea that he was so; and which may therefore be 
allowed to stand against the vague assertions so generally 
made to the contrary. As Hanover was to be immediately 
and unconditionally restored to its elector, an application 
appears to have been made, during the negotiation, by 
Bonaparte to the king of Prussia, to whom the possession 
of it had been ceded by France as a conquered province, to 
deliver it up to its former sovereign. This application ex- 
cited no small share of indignation on the part of the king 
of Prussia, who is said to have expressed his determina- 
tion, not to allow himself to be divested of his dominions 
at the will of the French ruler. The consequence of this 
was a most singular complication of affairs. We were al- 
ready at war with Prussia, who had also refused to divest 
herself of Hanover, although she had not the slightest pre- 
tensions to the sovereignty, and the establishment of peace 
between France and England might have depended upon 
it ; yet Prussia was now to be our ally; and this country 
had to defend her in a war, occasioned by her unjust re- 
fusal to restore to their lawful sovereign the patrimonial 
and long descended dominions of the house of Brunswick! 

As it had before been the fate of the Prussian monarch 
to remain inactive when he ought to have united his forces 
with those of the allied powers against France, so it was 
now his misfortune, or his obstinacy, to be obliged to de- 


39 


fend himself and his newly acquired electorate, against 
that power which had conferred it upon him, and had, to 
no purpose offered him an equivalent. This consideration 
did not however prevent the British ministry from warmly 
espousing his cause; and his former indifference to the in- 
terests of Europe, his indecent seizure of Hanover, his in- 
sulting exclusion of the British vessels from his ports, were 
all forgotten, in the paramount hope of repressing or over- 
turning by his assistance the power of France. Peace was 
immediately concluded with that sovereign; a confidential 
envoy was sent to assure him of the determined support of 
this country, and a sum of money sufficient to convince 
him of our sincerity, if not to facilitate his operations, was 
transmitted without delay. The rapidity of the French 
ruler did not however allow the Prussian monarch to avail 
himself of the aid of his allies, and after some contests of 
less importance, the battle of Jena decided his fate. With 
the loss of forty thousand men, including about twenty ge- 
nerals, he was compelled to retire before the victorious 
army of Bonaparte. The negotiation between France and 
England terminated on the sixth of October; and on the 
twenty-fourth of the same month the French ruler visited 
the tomb of the great Frederick, at Potsdam, whence he 
sent the sword and scarf of that illustrious monarch, 
as a present to the Hotel des Invalides at Paris. In three 
days afterwards he made his public entry into Berlin; and 
thus a powerful monarchy, founded upon principles purely 
military, in which every subject was born a soldier, liable 
to be called into service at the absolute will of the sove- 
reign, and where a system of martial rigor unexampled 
in Europe, had been acted upon without relaxation for 
more than half a century, was overturned in the course of 
a few days, by the newly formed armies and inexperienced 
conscripts of France. 


i 


40 


The bloody tragedy which had thus been renewed on 
the theatre of Europe, was not however yet destined to 
terminate. Neither the battles of Austerlitz and Jena, nor 
the fate of the Austrian and Prussian monarchs, had suffi- 
ciently repressed the military ardor of the emperor of 
Russia. After annulling the treaty of his envoy Mr. d’Ou- 
bril, he once more prepared for hostilities ; and encouraged 
by the promised co-operation of this country, again 
took the field. In the former struggles between the con- 
flicting powers on the continent, the contest, though san- 
guinary, had been short, and one or two engagements had 
decided the fate of an empire ; but the combat between 
France and Russia exhibited a very different spectacle. 
The incalculable resources of the immense territory of the 
czars, were opposed to the military population of France 
and her dependent states; the obstinate courage of the 
Russian soldiery, to the impetuous ardor of the French. 
Amidst all the difficulties of climate and of season, a war- 
fare was continued for several months, in which the vic- 
tory was often doubtful; but the successes of the French 
in the bloody contests of Bergfield, Deppin, Hof, Eylau,and 
Friedland, broke the strength and extinguished the hopes 
of the Russians. Compelled to negotiate for his safety, the 
king of Prussia was obliged to consent to the dismember- 
ment of his dominions, and to relinquish a population of 
five millions of subjects, in order to be allowed to retain the 
remainder. As the storm of war approached towards Pe- 
tersburg, the emperor of Russia began to dread the result 
of a contest in which so many of his powerful coadjutors 
had been overthrown. A conference between the two sove- 
reigns accordingly took place, and the treaty of Tilsit re- 
stored the continent of Europe to a mournful tranquillity. 


\ 


41 


Of the part which Great Britain acted in this dreadful 
struggle, it is not necessary to say much. The inefficiency 
of that union between her and Russia, which had been so 
triumphantly dwelt upon, as likely to restrain or overturn 
the power of France, soon became manifest. In a contest 
with an enemy whose promptitude is his distinguishing cha- 
racteristic, the services which either of these powers could 
render to the other were, comparatively, of no avail. De- 
barred by her natural situation, it was not in the power of 
Great Britain to assist her ally by the aid of a single man, 
or even to effect a diversion of any importance in his fa- 
vour; and she thus stood a silent spectator of the additional 
ruin of the governments of Europe, consequent upon the 
fatal rejection of the terms offered but a few months be- 
fore by the ruler of France. 

In the mean time a change had taken place in the British 
ministry, founded on one of the most extraordinary popular 
delusions ever practised on the credulity of a nation. As 
the new minister, consisted chiefly of those who had sup- 
ported with undeviating pertinacity the war system, it was 
not to be expected that any change of measures favourable 
to a pacification was likely to take place. In the treaty of 
Tilsit, an article had been introduced, by which the Rus- 
sian sovereign offered his mediation to any propositions 
for peace between France and Great Britain, provided 
such propositions were made within the space of one 
month; an opportunity which was suffered to elapse with- 
out any effectual method being taken to improve it. The 
important alteration in the aspect of public affairs, pro- 
duced by the subjugation of Prussia, the humiliation of 
Russia, and the treaty of Tilsit, operated however like a 
F 


42 


sudden shock upon the British ministry; and in one of 
those paroxysms to which associations of men are not less 
liable than individuals, they eagerly grasped at the first 
idea that presented itself as likely to counteract its effects. 
Amidst all the convulsions which Europe had experienced 
in consequence of the revolution in France, the kingdom 
of Denmark had, by the wise and temperate policy of her 
ruler, been in a great measure preserved from the fatal 
consequences of those commotions which had overturned 
governments of much greater political importance. This 
had been accomplished, not by humiliating herself to any 
of the belligerent powers ; not by espousing the cause of 
such of them as appeared for the moment to be successful; 
but by maintaining a firm, dignified, and undeviating inde- 
pendence, neither influenced by intrigues nor intimidated 
by threats. Her naval and military establishments, though 
not great, were respectable, and combining with the natu- 
ral advantages of her situation, might justify her in the 
hopes of defending herself with success against any enemy 
that should attempt to infringe upon her neutrality. In or- 
der to defend this neutrality, the Danish government had, 
for a considerable time past, concentred its army on its 
continental frontiers; and it has been stated, that this 
measure was adopted at the instance of Great Britain, as 
being favourable to the protection of her commerce. In 
this situation the British fleet, with a large military force, 
arrived on the coast of Zealand, where the Danish govern- 
ment saw no reason to recognise them in any other charac- 
ter than that of friends and protectors. They were there 
joined by the German legion from the isle of Rugen; and 
Mr. Jackson the British resident at Copenhagen, accord- 
ing to instructions received from his court, demanded 
from the Danish government the surrender of its navy 


43 


to his Britannic majesty, to be detained by him until the 
restoration of a general peace. This proposition was indig- 
nantly rejected; in consequence of which the troops were 
landed; and a proclamation was published by lord Cath- 
cart, the commander in chief, stating the motives and ob- 
jects of such a proceeding, and threatening, that in case of 
resistance the city of Copenhagen should be desolated by 
every possible means of devastation. Unprepared as 
the city then was, the crown prince gave orders that it 
should be defended to the last extremity. Of the Danish 
navy, not a ship was rigged, and the crews were absent. 
On the second day of September, the British troops com- 
menced the attack, on three sides of the city, which con- 
tinued for several days without intermission; during 
which 6500 shells were thrown into the town, which was 
soon on fire in upwards of thirty places. The timber yards 
were consumed; the powder magazine blew up; the stee- 
ple of the cathedral church was in a blaze, and fell amidst 
the continual shouts of the British troops. From the mode 
of attack which had been adopted, hostilities were not con- 
fined to the Danish soldiery and the armed burghers en- 
gaged in the defence of the city, but extended to the inha- 
bitants of both sexes ; the aged, the young, the infirm, the 
sick, and the helpless, for whose safety no opportunity was 
afforded of providing, and great numbers of whom perish- 
ed by the bursting of the shells, the fire of the artillery, 
and the innum rable accidents consequent on so dreadful 
and unexpected an attack. It soon appeared that the city 
was unable to make an effectual resistance ; the British 
forces having approached with their trenches so near, as 
to be enabled to set it on fire whenever they pleased. To 
prevent this consummation of misery, the Danish comman- 
der assented to terms of capitulation, by which he agreed 


44 


to surrender up the Heet, upon condition that the British 
army should evacuate the island of Zealand within six 
weeks, and that public and private property should in the 
mean time be respected. 

Soon after the accomplishment of this very extraordi- 
nary and unprecedented transaction, a declaration was issu- 
ed by the British government, for the avowed purpose of 
justifying it to Europe and to the world. As the facts were 
notorious and indisputable, no attempt is there made to 
palliate, in any respect, the horrors that attended it, and 
the declaration is confined to reasons of justification only. 

The first argument relied upon is u the cruel necessity 
“ xvhich obliged the British sovereign to have recourse to 
u acts of hostility against a nation , with which it was his 
u most earnest desire to have established the relations of 
u common interest and alliance .” This passage contains the 
complete avowal of the principle upon which the British 
ministry acted. It presumes not only that the laws of mo- 
rality and justice, and the rules of good faith, which attach 
one individual or one nation to another, may be dispensed 
with from temporary motives, but that either of the parties 
has a right to judge of such motives, and to disregard 
those rules, whenever he may think proper. That this 
doctrine cannot be supported, must be apparent to every 
one, from the slightest observation of the consequences to 
which it must lead. At no period of society have mankind 
been so lost to the dignity of their nature and the interests 
of their association, as to avow it. Even states and sove- 
reigns at war, under circumstances of the utmost exaspe- 
ration, have rejected it with horror; and it may truly be 
said, that the establishment of such a maxim, even between 


45 


belligerent powers, is all that is now wanting to complete 
the downfal of Europe, and to destroy the hopes of mankind. 
Jealousy, hatred, assassination, poison, treachery, cruelty, 
and revenge, are its instruments, to be indiscriminately 
employed as necessity requires , and upon these grounds 
every crime and every atrocity may be equally justified. 

That such doctrines have of late been asserted in this 
country in the most open and profligate manner, is a 
dreadful symptom of that moral and intellectual depravity 
which precedes the fall of nations. To read the daily effu- 
sions of some of our popular writers, one would suppose 
that the human race was not the offspring of one common 
parent. By one reverend divine we were some time since 
told from the pulpit, in the face of a learned university, 
that the nations of the earth have no laws in common , and 
that , xvhere there is no law there can be no transgression* 
That they are to be considered as so many wild beasts; and 
that the strongest, xvhen it has the power, has also the right 
to destroy the weakest . A political writer, whose works 
have obtained a very extensive circulation in this country, 
has also dared to insult the common feelings and the com - 
moti sense of mankind, by asserting that might constitutes 
right, that, with the maritime strength which this country 
now possesses, not a ship belonging to any other power 
should be suffered to pass the seas, but upon conditions pre- 
scribed by us; and to this he very impartially adds, that 
Bonaparte has also a right, where not prohibited by a pre- 
vious positive contract, to make what conquests he pleases. 
These absurd and extravagant positions are however more 
likely to open the eyes of the public, than to obtain its as- 
sent. To little purpose, indeed, must that man have stu- 
died, either within the walls of a college or without, who 


46 


does not know that all laws have existed prior to the pro- 
mulgation of them, and that it was as unlawful to rob or 
murder, before the prohibitory precept was committed to 
writing, as it has been since. It is on this very idea that 
Montesquieu has founded his immortal work, which is, in 
fact, an inquiry into laws as they subsist in the nature of 
things, and not in either positive precepts, or actual prac- 
tice. u Intelligent beings ,” says he, u have laws which they 
have made ; but they have also laws which they have not 
“ made* To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what 
u is commanded or forbidden by positive law , is to say , that 
u before the circle xvas traced , all its radii were not equal” 
But why resort to these authorities for truths which have 
received the highest sanction ? Are not nations uniformly 
spoken of in the sacred writings, as accountable, collective- 
ly, for their moral conduct? as being just or unjust; op- 
pressors, or oppressed? and are they not, as such, punish- 
ed or rewarded? A proof, not only that the Supreme Being 
imposes this responsibility upon them, but that the know- 
ledge and opinion of it has been admitted and acted upon 
through all ages, and that it has been reserved for the 
present day to discover that a nation is bound by no laws, 
human or divine, but that if it have the power, it has also 
the right to rob, murder, massacre, and despoil all that 
are unable to resist its violence, and may excuse its enor- 
mities under the pretext of cruel necessity. What then is 
this horrible doctrine, that disowns all responsibility ? that 
contemns the idea of a moral providence, and condescends 
not to justify its atrocities but by its will. What is it but a 
direct apostacy from the Creator and common Father of all 
his creatures? The crime, which as it is in its consequences 
of all others the most extensively injurious and destructive 
to the interests and the happiness of mankind, is uniformly 


47 


represented as the most peculiarly obnoxious to the divine 
displeasure; and which, under the just dispensations of an 
overruling providence, cannot fail to subject all who dare 
to avow it, to the awful denunciations recorded against 
those who shall disregard that great precept, equally appli- 
cable to nations as to individuals, To do justice ; to love 
mercy ; and to walk humbly with god. 

The assertion of such a principle as I have been animad- 
verting upon, by the British ministry, is the more unpardon- 
able, as they had before them the recent example of one of 
their predecessors, who, in rejecting the proposition made 
to him to assassinate the ruler of France, had placed this 
important subject in the most striking point of view. It 
was indeed but too apparent, from the observations to 
which this circumstance gave rise in the house of com- 
mons, on the part of some of those who now direct the 
affairs of this country, that the conduct of Mr. Fox on that 
occasion was beyond their comprehension, and conse- 
quently not likely to be the object of their imitation. Hap- 
pily, however, for the best interests of society, it is this 
conduct which has erected a standard for modern times, 
by which we may form a proper and infallible estimate of 
the conduct of those in power; and, if we measure by this 
the late inglorious attack upon Copenhagen, we shall find 
no difficulty, either in determining the characters of those 
who promoted it, or in discovering, that under similar 
circumstances Mr. Fox would have rejected such an idea 
with horror. 

The next ground of justification is, w that his majesty had 
u received the most positive information of the determination 
“ of the present ruler of France , to occupy the Danish terri - 


u tories, for the purpose of injuring the British commerce and 
u availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine for the in - 
“ vasion of Great Britain and Ireland Undoubtedly under 
such circumstances it would have been criminal in his majes- 
ty’s ministers not to have interfered. But was it necessary that 
this interference should be in the nature of a hostile attack 
upon Denmark ? upon a power who could only have sub- 
jected herself to the resentment of the enemy by refusing 
to violate her neutrality, and to relinquish her pacific al- 
liance with this country ? On the contrary, these circum- 
stances called upon us in the most imperious manner, by 
every tie of justice, of honour, and of policy, to afford to 
Denmark every assistance in our power in repelling the 
unjust aggression. That this might have been done with 
effect, by the union of the British arms and fleets with 
those of Denmark, can admit of no doubt. The insular 
situation of Zealand, and the superiority of the allied 
fleets over any that could be brought against them by the 
rest of the world, would have insured the most brilliant 
success. The consequences of this conduct would have 
been the preservation of that character for rectitude and 
integrity in our public relations, to which this country has 
always aspired, and which was, in fact, the chief motive 
for continuing the war. We should thus have secured the 
nearer attachment and confidence of a people naturally de- 
voted to our interests, whose sovereign is closely allied to 
our own, and who, from every previous circumstance, had 
aright, instead of hostility, to expect assistance. We should 
have raised up a standard before which the character and 
pride of France would have been humbled to the dust, and 
around which all that is great and independent in Europe 
would have rallied, in full confidence that the integrity of 
Great Britain was inflexible. We should have provided for 


49 


the safety, and secured the independence of Sweden, who 
now stands before her powerful enemy 

w Single , unpropped , and nodding to her fall” 

We should have done away all pretexts for the hostility 
of those continental powers with whom we are now at en- 
mity, and should have entitled ourselves to the involun- 
tary respect and admiration even of our enemiesthemselves. 

If it had happened that Denmark had, of her own ac- 
cord, thrown off her pacific connexions with Great Bri- 
tain, and intentionally entered into the views of France, 
this would indeed have afforded a better apology for the 
conduct of the British ministry, although it may be doubted 
whether even this would have justified the treacherous and 
sanguinary nature of the attack. But no such pretext is 
even alluded to in the justification. On the contrary, Den- 
mark is said to be threatened by France with a hostile 
army on her frontiers, and that she had shown on a former 
occasion that she was not able to resist the operation of ex- 
ternal influence, and the threats of a formidable neighbour- 
ing power. The natural and proper result of this is, that 
she ought to have been supported by us in defending her- 
self. If she had been criminal, punish her; but if she were 
weak, protect her. Thus we should at the same moment 
have converted a neutral into an ally, and raised that ally 
to importance; a part of the policy of the present ruler of 
France, which it would be much better for this country to 
have imitated, than to have contended with him in that 
course of conduct by which he is stated to have inspired 
so much dread into the nations of the world; the honour of 
which we are now determined he shall no longer reserve 
to himself. 


G 


50 


Such are the considerations that arise upon the state- 
ment of ministers, that France was meditating an imme- 
diate attack upon the Danish territories; but it must be 
further observed, that even this rests hitherto upon their 
own assertion only; and that the declaration has not dis- 
closed a single fact, nor alleged a single circumstance in 
support of it, further than “ the notorious and repeated de- 
u clarations of the enemy , its recent occupation of the towns 
u and territories of other neutral states , and the preparations 
u actually made for collecting a hostile force upon thefron- 
u tiers of his Danish majesty's continental dominions 
circumstances which, if they had existed, would have been 
as well known to the rest of Europe as to his majesty’s 
ministers. Of these reasons the last is the most important, 
as the assembling of French troops on the Danish con- 
fines, would certainly be a just cause of vigilance and sus- 
picion; but when we examine the phraseology adopted by 
ministers on this occasion, we shall find that no such as- 
sembling is in fact asserted; and it is only that prepara- 
tions were made for collecting a force for the purpose. 
Whether ministers have in their possession such docu- 
ments as will demonstrate to the public and the world, 
that they had at least a just foundation for their fears, or 
whether on the contrary, the additional disgrace awaits 
them, of having alleged the projected attack upon Den- 
mark by France, as a pretext for their own unjust aggres- 
sion, a short time will now show; but if we may judge 
from an expression in the subsequent declaration of this 
country against Russia, in which it is asserted that his ma- 
jesty's justification in his expedition against Copenhagen is 
already before the world , there seems little reason to ex- 
pect those satisfactory elucidations of the intentions of 
France, without which the perpetrators of the transactions 


51 


here alluded to, have incurred a responsibility, for which 
it is to be hoped they will ere long be called to a serious 
account. 

The third reason alleged in the declaration, as a justifi- 
cation for the attack upon Copenhagen, is, The example of 
France . “ It was time,” we are told, u that the effects of 
that dread which France has inspired into the nations of 
the world, should be counteracted by an exertion of the 
power of Great Britain, called for by the exigency of the 
crisis, and proportioned to the magnitude of the danger .” 
Thus then, after all the accusations poured out by this 
country against the French ruler; his unbounded ambi- 
tion, his disregard of alliances, his oppression of friendly 
and neutral states, it is openly confessed that we have our- 
selves adopted a similar course of conduct, and intend 
henceforth to contend with him in the race of iniquity. 
The example of France is now no longer a zvarning, but 
a pattern for Great Britain; and after having so long con- 
demned the policy of Bonaparte, we are at length become 
converts to it and confess it to be right. Apostates to the 
cause of virtue, independence, and integrity, which we 
pretend to have so long supported, we now openly ac- 
knowledge that it cannot contend with that of iniquity and 
oppression. The dread inspired into the nations of the 
world by the French, is to be rivalled by the dread in- 
spired by the English; and it must be owned that our first 
effort, as exhibited in our attack upon Copenhagen, gives 
us a fair title to that u bad eminence,” which it seems is 
now become the great object of our ambition. Conquerors 
in open war have indeed been cruel and unsparing to their 
enemies; governments which have displayed an open hos- 
tility to more powerful states, or which, after repeated re- 


monstrances, have persevered in maintaining alliances sup- 
posed to be injurious to a belligerent and successful power, 
have been changed or extinguished; but this is the first in- 
stance on record, where the capital of a long established 
nation has been surprised by the arms of a state in strict 
alliance, not only without notice and without remonstrance, 
but without the slightest charge of misconduct against 
either the sovereign or the people, and desolated by every 
~ possible means of devastation . It is impossible that any ex- 
ample in civilized history can be alleged to justify such an 
attack; and if a model is to be found, it can only be amongst 
the barbarian hordes of Africa. 

If, from examining into the nature of these transactions, 
in which so many peaceable and unoffending persons have 
suffered a political martyrdom, we turn to contemplate 
the consequences to which it has already given' rise, we 
shall not be less struck with the impolicy, than w have 
already been with the iniquity of such a transaction. 
Whether wisely or not, it has for a long time been the 
anxious endeavour of this country to maintain an intimate 
connexion with the continental powers, for the continu- 
ance of which it has made the most incredible sacrifices. 
•Of these not even the overwhelming power of Bonaparte 
had been able entirely to deprive us. Austria, amidst all 
the vicissitudes of the sanguinary wars in which she had 
been engaged, and even after she was compelled to accede 
to an alliance with France for the security of her crown, 
was stili favourably disposed towards this country. Russia, 
although she too had been obliged to accept of the terms 
proposed by Bonaparte, had endeavoured to manifest her 
attachment to England by an offer to become the mediator 
for a peace between England and France. Sweden was at- 


53 


tached to the cause of England, or rather hostile to that of 
France, to a romantic degree; and Denmark, although she 
appears to have maintained a strict neutrality, was doubt- 
less inclined rather to increase than to weaken her natural 
alliance with England. How deplorably has this aspect 
of affairs been changed by the attack upon Copenhagen! 
In the first place, it has thrown Denmark into the arms of 
France. We have indeed obtained eighteen ships of the 
line, which are not of the least use to us ; but the seamen 
which should have manned them, and who might by just 
and temperate measures have been engaged in our cause, 
are now destined to serve in the fleets of our enemies, to 
whom their assistance is invaluable. In the sovereign, the 
ministers, and the people of Denmark, we have excited a 
resentment in some degree commensurate to the outrage 
committed upon them. All our offers of peace and recon- 
ciliation have met not only with refusal, but contempt ; 
and the severest measures of retaliation have been adopted 
against British subjects in the Danish states. 

These effects were such as any man acquainted with the 
true springs of human conduct would have foreseen, and 
as any minister who respected either himself or his coun- 
try, would most anxiously have deprecated. Austria no 
sooner received intelligence of the attack by this country 
upon Denmark, than she is said to have declared war 
against England, and to have dismissed her ambassador. 
The ports of Holland and other parts of the continent 
were more rigidly closed, and new restrictions imposed 
upon the commerce of this country. Even the emperor of 
Russia, on account of whose interests we had made such 
sacrifices, and for whom we had continued the war when 
terms satisfactory to ourselves were offered by France, 


54 


regarding this transaction of the British ministry as a re- 
nunciation of all the ties of honour and good faith, and as 
an act of violence committed in a sea, the safety of which 
was peculiarly under his guarantee, issued a proclamation 
amounting to an express declaration of war against En- 
gland. In this document, which nothing could justify or 
extenuate but the most flagrant violation, on the part of 
this country, of every principle of morality, honour, and 
good faith, he not only refuses his mediation for effecting 
a peace between Denmark and England, the request of 
which he considers as a personal insult, but declares u that 
44 he annuls for ever every preceding convention between 
44 England and Russia, proclaims anew the principles of the 
44 armed neutrality , and engages that there shall be no re- 
44 establishment of concord between Russia and England 
44 till satisfaction shall have been given to Denmark .” 

The recent declaration of the British ministry in reply 
to that of Russia, by no means tends to reconcile the 
breach between the two countries. The Russian emperor 
is there treated, without reserve, as having made the most 
humiliating concessions to France, injurious to the glory 
of the Russian name, and to the interests of the Russian 
empire, and hopes are therein expressed that he would 
have broken through his engagements, and again joined in 
hostilities against France. By an asperity of expression, 
which it is impossible for any circumstance of public af- 
fairs to justify, France is described as equally and essen- 
tially the enemy both of Great Britain and Russia, and 
thus a sentiment is avowed which amounts to nothing less 
than the signal for a war of extermination between Great 
Britain and France. At the same time it is asserted, with 
the most disgraceful inconsistency, 44 that the war was 


55 


“ undertaken by Great Britain at the instigation of Russia , 
u and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian in - 
u terests against the influence of France .” Where then is 
the proof that England and France are essentially ene- 
mies ? particularly, when it now appears that Russia has 
effected her reconciliation with France, and declared war 
against this country ? 

Before we quit this subject, it is impossible to avoid 
considering the difference between the situation in which 
this country stood at the close of the negotiation in 1806, 
and* that in which she stands at the present period. At 
that time she asserted her honour and demonstrated her 
attachment to her ally by the most rigid fidelity, and the 
most important sacrifices. The consequence was, as might 
be expected, a great accession of respectability to the na- 
tional character. At present she is stained with the blood 
of her friends, whom she has attacked by surprise, by 
every means of devastation ; the result of which has been a 
general cry of horror and indignation against her, from 
one extremity of Europe to the other. Thus from that 
high and dignified rank which she had till that fatal mo- 
ment supported, she was, by one atrocious act, degraded 
in the eyes of the world beyond what language can express. 
For what purpose then did his majesty make the great 
personal sacrifice of refusing the terms proposed to him by 
France in 1806, which were to restore to him the heredi- 
tary continental dominions of the house of Brunswick? 
For what purpose did this country refuse to accept the 
cession of Malta, the very object for which she had com- 
menced the war?. For what purpose were his majesty’s 
subjects called upon to make those additional efforts, 
which they were told, by the highest authority, could not 


56 


be too great for the attainment of the object in view? For 
what, but to preserve the sanctity of our treaties? to de- 
monstrate that no advantages, either to the sovereign or 
the people, were to be obtained by the dereliction of 
principle? and that we might stand in the eyes of Europe 
clear from the most distant imputation of infidelity to our 
allies? But the conduct adopted by our present ministers 
with regard to Denmark, has not only deprived us of these 
most inestimable advantages, but has affixed a stain upon 
the British name which it will require ages to remove. 

The same unjust and precipitate transaction which has 
thus wounded the honour and character of the country, 
has also given a new aspect to our public affairs, infinitely 
more gloomy than any that has before presented itself. 
With a revenue which must necessarily diminish with the 
diminution of our commerce, occasioned by our total ex- 
clusion from the continent of Europe, we are now called 
upon for greater sacrifices, and have to bear alone the 
whole pressure pf the war. Nor are these sacrifices con- 
fined to those of a pecuniary nature. In every contest that 
may henceforth take place between France and England, 
British courage alone must be employed, and British 
blooa must flow. We are now effectually deprived of those 
powerful allies, who hitherto engaged the attention of our 
enemies, and rendered the continent the theatre of war; 
and the two countries be again destined to meet in the 
field, the next battle that will be fought will most probably 
be fought on English ground. Flushed with their victories 
over the nations of the north, and eager to terminate a war 
which has for a series of years required from them such 
exertions, the armies of France are returning once more 
to the shores of the ocean, impatient for an opportunity 


57 


of closing their labours in the humiliation of these islands 
and the destruction of their inhabitants ; who, if they now 
fall, will fall without a friend to regret them, or theFarm of 
an ally to be raised in their defence. This sudden aud un-, 
expected alteration in our prospects is the more to be re- 
gretted, as instead of inciting those wise, temperate, and 
precautionary measures, which the exigency of the occa- 
sion requires, it is regarded, by the blind and bigoted 
promoters of the war, with the most stupid indifference* 
or the most ill-timed and preposterous confidence ; as if 
these islands had been placed by providence beyond the 
sphere of human calamity, or as if their inhabitants had 
merited by their virtues the particular favour of heaven. 

I have thus endeavoured, as explicitly and as impartially 
as is in my power, to state the real and true grounds of the 
war, in which, with a short interval, we have now been fifteen 
years engaged, and which, after having begun with all Eu- 
rope in alliance with us against France, we are now continu- 
ing with all Europe in alliance with France against us. In 
the usual course of affairs it is not requisite for the people at 
large to interfere with their opinions in matters of govern- 
ment ; but there are times when it is not only proper, but 
necessary; and if ever such a period existed, it is at the 
present moment. It is now become the business of every' 
individual, of every rank, to examine into the causes , the 
object , and the consequences of a war which has so long op- 
pressed and harassed the country. If it should appear, as 
I have before attempted to show, that the war which be- 
gan in 1803, was instigated by a few interested and un- 
principled individuals, and by a spirit of animosity and 
rancor, which blew up into a conflagration, a contemptible 
dispute about the island of Malta; that in the year 1806, 
H 


58 


peace might have been established, if we had not preferred 
the interests of Russia to our own, and that this cause of 
hostilities between France and Great Britain, is now re- 
moved by the treaty of Tilsit and the declaration of war by 
Russia against Great Britain, it will then be incumbent on 
us most calmly and seriously to inquire, what are the pre- 
sent grounds which, upon any principles of common huma- 
nity, common sense, or common interest, ought to keep 
the two countries at enmity with each other? If upon ma- 
ture reflection we find that such grounds really exist, this 
examination will only tend to unite us more closely in the 
prosecution of the war, and to reconcile us to such further 
sacrifices as we may yet be called upon to make. If, on 
the contrary, we find that the reasons alleged in support of 
the war are weak and futile, and that its further prosecu- 
tion promises no advantages equal to the difficulties and 
dangers we must inevitably incur from it, we may then 
think it advisable, without relaxing in those efforts which 
are necessary for carrying it on, to approach the throne of 
a sovereign whose interest and happiness are essentially 
connected with those of his people ; and in dutiful and 
loyal addresses, to intreat that he would, when a proper 
opportunity occurs, adopt such measures as he may con- 
ceive to be most likely for restoring to these kingdoms 
the blessings of peace. 

If it be true, as we are every day reminded by the ad- 
vocates for the war, that we are to contend for our consti- 
tution, our liberties, our religion, and our laws, it is only 
because we ourselves bring them voluntarily forwards, and 
submit them to the hazard of the die. At what period, 
since the revolution in France, has the French govern- 
ment proposed to us that we should relinquish or divest 
urselves of any of these invaluable treasures? If we look 


59 


either to the treaty of Amiens, the discussions on the war 
in 1803 , or the negotiations in 1806 , we find no traces of 
any propositions on the part of France, which could in- 
fringe in the slightest degree upon the independence, the 
interest, or the prosperity of this country. Even the com- 
plaints made by the French ruler against the licentiousness 
of the British press, were abandoned, and eventually 
formed no part of the discussions. In the negotiations in 
1806 , we shall find, that so far from any concessions being 
required from us, every demand upon which we insisted 
as essential to the interests of this country , was complied 
with. They were, in fact, even more than complied with, 
the island of Tobago was voluntarily added by the 
French to their own concessions, upon the principle al- 
leged by them, and not by our ministers, that it was a Bri- 
tish island. Is it then in this that we recognise any inten- 
tion on the part of France to encroach upon either our 
honour or our interest ? or has it not been on the contrary 
openly asserted by the present administration, that the 
proffered peace was rejected, not because the terms were 
unacceptable to England, but because they were unsatis- 
factory to Russia ? If, however, instead of acceding to just 
and reasonable terms of accommodation, we choose, 
through motives of animosity, of resentment, of jealousy, 
or of pride, to continue the war, we then must contend for 
our liberties, our lives, and our existence ; as any indivi- 
dual in private life may, if he think proper, stake his 
whole fortune against a bubble, and have only himself to 
blame for the result. We might have continued at peace 
in 1803 , if we would have evacuated Malta, as we had 
agreed to do by the treaty of Amiens ; or would even have 
been satisfied with a ten years possession of it. We might 
have had in 1806 , with the cession ©f Hanover, Malta, 


60 


and the Cape, with the possessions of the French in the 
East Indies, and the island of Tobago in the West, and 
with an acknowledged right of interference in the affairs 
of the continent, if our connexion with Russia had not 
prevented us from accepting these terms. We may have 
it yet, in all probability, if we can subdue our exasperated 
passions, artificially blown into a flame by those whose in- 
terest and whose gratification it is to hurry us on to our 
ruin ; men who are lost to every feeling of the true inte- 
rests of their country, and who, in case its constitution 
should be subverted by a foreign power, would be the first, 
not only to testify their implicit submission to any go- 
vernment, however tyrannical it might be, but to direct its 
Vengeance against those genuine friends of liberty and 
truth, who would, under every change of exterior circum- 
stances, remain unchanged, and who after having defend- 
ed their principles in their lives, would seal them by their 
blood. 

Were we to divest ourselves for a moment of that irri- 
tation of mind and inflexibility of heart, which blinds us to 
all the evils and horrors of war, it would be impossible that 
we should not acknowledge the calamities it introduces, 
and feel a most sincere disposition to terminate them. If 
we turn our eyes to the continent of Europe, what devasta- 
tion and slaughter has it occasioned from the confines of 
Russia to the southern extremity of Italy! If we look to 
Egypt or South America, we still find the same cause for 
sorrow and regret. At no period of society have the con- 
tests of the field been more obstinate, or attended with such 
a profuse destruction of human life. To the sufferings and 
the death of the thousands who have fallen, we are to add 
the misery and the ruin of the tens of thousands who sur- 


61 


vive them, who have to lament the death of their relatives, 
their protectors, and friends ; and who amidst grief, and 
hunger, and wretchedness, pour forth their curses on the 
unsparing sword of war, and on those who call it into action. 
Nor, though this country, from its insular situation, has 
hitherto been exempt from these horrors, can we flatter 
ourselves that we have escaped uninjured. Ask the me- 
chanic, who thrown out of employ by the effects of the war, 
sees a family, dependent solely on his exertions, perishing 
for want of that aid which he is willing, but no longer able 
to bestow. Ask the villager, who is now compelled by the 
ballot to quit his peaceful occupations, and join the ranks 
of the militia. Ask the sailor, who on his return from his 
long voyage is forcibly torn from family and friends, and 
whose generous spirit repays the hardships which his coun- 
try imposes upon him, by devoting his life to her defence. 
Ask the manufacturer, who sees his industry frustrated, 
and his hopes destroyed, by circumstances which he could 
neither foresee nor prevent; or the merchant, who finds his 
exertions crippled on every side, and who in order to car- 
ry on a diminished trade, is reduced to the most humiliat- 
ing expedients. Even the higher classes of the community 
deeply feel, in the increasing burdens of the state, the ef- 
fects of the long continued system of warfare in which we 
have been involved. It is true, all this, and much more 
ought to be suffered, if we have an object in view adequate 
to the sacrifice. Life itself cannot be better lost than in the 
service of our country; but when it is evident that the war 
exists not by any irremediable necessity, but is the result 
of the passions of the wicked, who hesitate at no sacrifices 
to gratify their resentment; and of the fears of the weak, 
who in the apprehension of distant dangers are insensible 
to those which are immediately impending over them: 


62 


when to these considerations it is added, that all the 
grounds which have hitherto been suggested for carrying 
on the war have ceased to operate, and that it is yet perhaps 
at the option of this country to terminate the present hos- 
tilities and close the scene of blood ; we may then, surely, 
be allowed to doubt, whether the sacrifices which every part 
of the community is thus called upon to make, may not be 
dispensed with, and whether we have any object in view 
worth the price at which alone it is to be acquired. 

If a just, a safe, and lasting reconciliation be attainable, 
and that it is not so, has not as yet been decisively ascer- 
tained, it may most truly be observed, that there is no 
country under heaven which can derive such benefit from 
peace as Great Britain. Possessed of a marine superior to 
that of all the rest of the world ; sovereign of the most ex- 
tensive colonial territories that ever acknowledged obedi- 
ence to a parent state ; superior in capital, in ingenuity, in 
industry, and in mercantile probity, to every nation upon 
earth ; what can she wish for, but for that fair and open 
competition in which she may be left to the free exertion 
of her resources and the full use of her energies. In a state 
of war she has her equals, in a state of peace she has none. 
It may be the policy of a country strong in arms, but infe- 
rior in commerce and manufactures, to promote her inter- 
ests by force, and to compel the countries subject to, or 
dependent upon her, to rest satisfied with such articles as 
she can furnish, to the exclusion of the Superior manufac- 
tures of other countries ; but of this Great Britain stands 
in no need. All that she has to ask, is a fair and open mar- 
ket, where the skill of her artificers and the spirit of her 
merchants may have their proper sphere of action. This 
the restoration of peace would ere long afford ; and by this 


63 


happy change, some compensation would be made to the 
country, for the disadvantages and losses which it has for 
so many years patiently sustained on account of the war. 

It must not however be supposed, that because all former 
reasons for carrying on the war have either been proved to 
have had no sufficient foundation, or have been effectually 
removed, the promoters of it are therefore destitute of pre- 
texts to justify the headlong and violent measures which 
they incessantly recommend. As one cause of enmity is 
relinquished, another is discovered still more alarming, 
and the present grand objection to a peace is, that “ if it 
“ zvere once established , it would enable France to create 
“ A marine, by which she might overpozver the British 
w navy , and subjugate the country .” The formidable na- 
ture of this objection, and the influence which such a sen- 
timent at present possesses over the public mind, render it 
necessary to give it a brief, but serious and impartial con- 
sideration. 

France, it may in the first place be observed, notwith- 
standing her increase of dominion and extent of coast, is 
not naturally disposed to become a great naval power. Nei- 
ther her interests, nor the genius of her inhabitants incline 
her to it. To Great Britain, commerce is an object of the 
first importance; to France it is only secondary. Abound- 
ing with almost every article of necessity and of luxury, 
she can, in a great measure, dispense with foreign supplies ; 
and her marine, except when she has been compelled to 
make a few temporary efforts, has scarcely at any time been 
more than a navy of defence. Even in her most prosperous 
times, and under the most ambitious of her sovereigns, the 
states of Holland have been her superiors ; a circumstance 


64 


only to be accounted for by the extent of their maritime 
commerce, and the naval genius of their inhabitants. Ap- 
prehensions, it is true, may be indulged till they approach 
to insanity; and they who have contemplated the astonish- 
ing achievements of Bonaparte by land, seem to suppose 
that when he turns his attention to naval affairs, he must 
instantly be successful. But in the present situation of 
France, the cases are wholly dissimilar. In contending 
with the nations of the continent, he has had the advan- 
tages of that acknowledged military spirit natural to the 
French nation; of numbers, in general, equal at least 
to those of his enemies, and of talents concentrated 
in himself and his chief officers, beyond all that mo- 
dern times have known. By sea, all this is, at present, 
precisely the reverse. Neither the natural inclination of 
the people, the number or equipment of his ships of war, 
including those of all his allies and dependents, nor the ex- 
perience and skill of his commanders, are in any degree to 
be compared with those of Great Britain. That superiority 
which we at present enjoy, a state of peace would enable us 
not only to retain, but to improve. In our great colonial 
possessions and extensive maritime commerce, we possess 
advantages beyond any that France can boast of ; and as 
these are the real foundation of maritime strength, the ra- 
tio of our increase in a state of peace, must, independent 
of our present superiority, exceed that of France, in a de- 
gree proportioned to the superiority of our resources. Our 
commanders and seamen too, distinguished by naval ex- 
ploits of unexampled heroism, are already formed by long 
experience, and will be at all times ready to support the 
glory of the British name ; whilst the naval commanders of 
France yet remain to be created, and can only be formed by 
a long series of hostile discipline. It is not in a state of 
peace that such acquirements are made ; and therefore un- 


65 


less France be compelled, by causes which chiefly depend 
upon ourselves, to make extraordinary exertions to raise 
a navy, and habituate her officers and crews to naval dis- 
cipline, there is little probability that, in this respect, she 
will ever even attempt to become formidable to Great 
Britain. 

Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that France 
Would, in case of a peace, be enabled to increase her navy, 
so as to threaten the independence of this country, what is 
our remedy against it? The answer is ready from the whole 
tribe of alarmists ; perpetual war. This is the avowed 
object of all their exertions, the sole preservative against 
all their terrors. Continually haunted in imagination by 
the spectre, Bonaparte, they cannot sleep in peace, unless 
the blood of their fellow subjects be daily and hourly flow- 
ing in their defence, in every part of the world. Grant the 
nation but a momentary respite, and all is ruined! Their 
favourite idea is, “ that the British fleets are to remain 
“ through every change of season on the stormy coasts of 
w the Atlantic, ready to intercept the commerce, and to 
“crush in embryo the rising navy of France;” and this 
they consider as the permanent state of the two countries 
through all future times. 

On this new phrensy which has seized the nation, it 
may be observed that, in the first place, it is impossible 
the country can long maintain such a warfare ; and in the 
next, that if it could, it would by no means answer the 
end in view. Great Britain, it must be recollected, is, after 
all, a commercial state, and by her commerce she must 

I ’ 


66 


now stand or fall.* Her present unavoidable annual expen- 
diture amounts to more than the entire gross rents of all 
the landed property in the kingdom ; and the increased 
expense of her navies and armies, to say nothing of foreign 

* Speculations have lately been hazarded to show that this 
country is independent of commerce, and that her resources 
are wholly within herself. As a general proposition, it may be 
admitted that agriculture is the only foundation of wealth ; but 
this must be taken with relation to the world at large, and it 
may not follow that the cultivation of the soil, to the exclusion 
of other occupations, will be the policy of every particular coun- 
try, any more than of every individual in a society. The fact is, 
that agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, have all been 
found to be real sources of national greatness; and it is not there- 
fore from general principles and abstract reasonings that we are 
to give an exclusive preference of one to the other. How far 
they are to be conjointly or separately encouraged, must depend 
upon a due consideration of various circumstances, to which 
the writers alluded to have not sufficiently attended; such as the 
extent of territory, the fertility of the soil, the insular or con- 
tinental situation of the country, and the talents, acquirements, 
and disposition of the inhabitants. Accordingly as these are judi- 
ciously consulted, the true interests of a country will be pro- 
moted, and it is by this diversity of pursuits, and the conse- 
quent interchange of productions, talent and labour, that Provi- 
dence has united together the great society of mankind. To 
what cause are we to attribute the power of Venice in the be- 
ginning of the sixteenth century, when she withstood, both by 
sea and land, the whole force of Europe combined against her 
in the league of Cambray ? or how are we to account for the 
former greatness of the states of Holland; the most formidable 
maritime foe that this country ever encountered ? In these in- 
stances manufactures had little, and agriculture no concern. 
How then can it be denied that commerce may be rendered a 


67 


subsidies, which it may be hoped will never again be ad- 
verted to but to be execrated, must therefore be supplied 
from her commercial intercourse, which can alone open 
a channel for her manufactures, and furnish those returns 
on which the income of the state so essentially depends. 
What then can be the consequence of our blockading the 
continent, but a total exclusion of our ships and merchan- 
dize from its ports? In reply to this, it has been said, “ Al- 
u though Bonaparte holds the continental gates of the market , 
u yet in war we command all the roads that lead to it , and 
u can therefore starve him into the admission of our 
u trade”* Has this writer already forgotten the attempt 
made by this country to starve France into submission ,* 
and the consequences with which it was repaid upon our- 
selves? or does he conceive that it will be an easier task for 
us to starve the continent of Europe than the dominions of 
France? To ground any calculations of the revenues of 
the state upon the experience of the past, would, therefore 
now be fallacious; new circumstances having arisen, which 
have placed the country in a new situation, the result of 

source of national weaith ? That Great Britain derives a consi- 
derable part of her riches from agricultural pursuits is indispu- 
table; and every effort to promote them is entitled to the highest 
praise; but her peculiar character is that of a manufacturing and 
commercial nation. $.s a mere agricultural state she would stand 
low indeed in the scale of nations; but if, in addition to her agri- 
culture, she exert herself to maintain that superiority in her 
manufactures and commerce which she has already acquired, 
and secure those advantages by the establishment of peace, she 
may look to the continuance of her prosperity not only with 
probability but with confidence. 

* Dangers of the Country, p. 86. 


68 


which will probably shortly appear in the additional taxes 
to which the people must submit. It will not therefore long 
be in the power of this country to make those immense 
and unremitting sacrifices of blood and treasure, which 
are requisite to sooth the terrors of these blind instigators 
of perpetual war. But there is another danger not 
quite so chimerical as their fears. By this protracted war- 
fare and increased expense, we shall, in all probability, 
bring on, and that much sooner than seems to be generally 
supposed, that embarrassment of public credit, which may 
lead to the most dangerous consequences ; and may not 
only give rise, as the same circumstances did in France, to 
the most dreadful civil commotions, but may open the way 
to an exasperated adversary, to accomplish that ruin which 
we are all so anxious to avert. 

But, in the next place, the blockading system, even if it 
could be indefinitely continued, will not effect the purpose 
intended. If the building of ships could form a navy, and 
if the French ruler be inclined to build them, he may ac- 
complish it at various ports, either within the limits of his 
own dominions, or of those of his dependent allies, without 
danger of their being destroyed by the British fleet. Even 
if his harbours were more exposed than many of them are, 
his immense trains of artillery and his numerous and well 
appointed armies, now unoccupied, might be employed 
in defending them against any hostile attack, until he had 
raised a fleet which he might suppose sufficiently powerful 
to contend with our own. Nor will the British navy be able, 
as experience has shown, to prevent him from preparing 
at various places a flotilla of transports, for the purpose 
of conveying his troops across the channel for the attack 
of these kingdoms; which might remain in continual rea- 
diness to take advantage of any opportunity of wind and 


69 


weather to effect a passage. That all this is not only greatly 
to be dreaded, but is also highly probable, is admitted in 
the strongest terms by those -very persons in this country 
who are most earnest in support of the war; one of whom 
has asserted, that M it -would not be possible for us to block - 
u ade them all , through every season , and -with fleets , and 
u armies sufficiently strong , if our navy -were three times 
4t as large and as potent as it actually zs.”% And yet, this 
writer is anxious to persuade us that we ought to wage 
perpetual war, in order to prevent Bonaparte from u re- 
plenishing his navy and restoring his marine l \ But under 
these formidable apprehensions, there is one consolatory 
circumstance; that these immense preparations are not the 
voluntary act of our enemy, who has probably other objects 
in view ; but are forced upon him by the persevering hosti- 
lity of this country, and the declared purpose of waging 
against him a perpetual war ; or in other words, of 
contending with him till one of the two countries be des- 
troyed as a nation and subjugated to the will of the other.j; 

* Dangers of the Country, p. 110. 

f u I conclude therefore, that in relaxing by a peace the naval 
u and commercial embargo to which the enemy is now subjec- 
u ted, and enabling him thereby to replenish his navy and restore 
u his marine , we should incur very formidable new dangers 
a without at all diminishing the old.” ibid. p. 81. 

| “ He (Bonaparte) says there is room enough in the world 
(i both for himself and us. ’Tis false, there is not room enough 
“ in it for his new despotism and the liberties of England.” 
War in Disguise, p. 218. How then did the liberties of England 
exist so long in the same world with the ancient government 
of France? or why were Mr. Pitt and his friends so anxious to 
re-establish that government? Having fought so long to pre- 
serve ourselves against the infection of liberty , we are now it 
seems unaccountably seized with a horror of despotism. 


70 


Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that 
every effort will be made by him for the invasion of these 
islands; which will thereby be kept in a continual state of 
agitation and alarm; their safety or their destruction de- 
pending upon the uncertainty of the seasons; and a thou- 
sand circumstances incident to a naval defence, against 
which no prudence can guard. 

But the most important observation of all, on this 
subject, is, that this unjustifiable and desperate attempt to 
maintain a perpetual war, will not only in all probability 
disappoint our hopes, but have a direct and inevitable tend- 
ency to occasion the very calamities which it is meant to 
avert. Such indeed are the usual consequences of that ex- 
travagant caution, which is, in fact, the utmost extreme of 
cowardice; and which to guard against contingent or ima- 
ginary dangers, thinks no sacrifices too great. In the 
commencement of the French revolution, France was not 
military. Her first defenders were a raw and undisciplin- 
ed soldiery. The attack of her enemies called out her ener- 
gies, and she has overthrown tlw proudest monarchs of 
Europe. Had she been suffered to establish, without inter- 
ruption, her own form of government, such a result would 
not have taken place. It was therefore the attack upon 
France that converted that country into a nation of sol- 
diers, and compelled her to have recourse for her defence 
to a government purely military. In like manner France 
is not now a naval power; and in a state of tranquillity 
would be still less likely to attempt it, than under similar 
circumstances she would have been likely to have aimed 
at a military character. But if she be compelled to as- 
sume it; if she find herself threatened with perpetual 
war, harassed from year to year by protracted hostilities, 
and should once be convinced that there could be no 


71 


termination of them, until she could meet the fleets of 
Great Britain on the ocean with a superior force, it is im- 
possible to say that the same spirit which has been mani- 
fested by land may not be excited by sea, and give rise to 
that very rivalship which we so greatly dread ; an event the 
more to be apprehended, as she is now associated in the 
same cause with almost every maritime state in Europe. 
If the early attack upon France by the allied powers had 
any other motive than plunder, it was the result of a 
dastardly and overweening jealousy, which saw, in the 
supposed establishment of freedom in France, some 
remote consequences that might endanger the despo- 
tic establishments, and relieve the oppressed vassals of 
other continental governments. To prevent these conse- 
quences France was attacked, and the result has been that 
almost all these governments have been overturned and 
the sovereigns of most of them driven from their thrones. 
Is it possible that with such an example before our eyes, 
we can blindly and obstinately pursue a similar track? 
That we can consent to become the instructors of France 
in naval affairs, as the nations of the continent have been 
in military tactics? That we can for a moment forget, that 
with such a population as that of France and her dependent 
states, defeat is no object, provided she be making those 
acquirements and forming that character, at which, for her 
own safety, she is compelled to aim? And can it be possi- 
ble, that after having contributed all in our power to 
school her armies till they have conquered the continent, 
we should now begin to school her navies, till we have 
taught them to triumph over ourselves? 

Another assumption founded on the same irrational and 
disgraceful principle, is, that if we make peace with France 


we shall bind ourselves up from observing her conduct, or 
interfering with her on any future occasion ; the conse- 
quence of which will be, that she will not only be enabled 
to provide a navy for our invasion, but may, during peace, 
have all preparations made for the attack, and may fall 
upon us unawares, whilst we are totally unprovided for our 
defence. That such an idea could enter into the head of 
any one who has not resigned his understanding to his 
fears, and does not labour under a partial derangement, is 
impossible. Supposing (if such a supposition can be borne) 
that peace between France and Great Britain were estab- 
lished, it is not the task of a day, a month, or a year, to 
create a navy. We could at all times observe the progress 
of the French in their dock-yards and arsenals, with al- 
most as much certainty as the operations which are con- 
ducted in our own ports; and if it should appear that ex- 
traordinary efforts were making to increase the marine of 
France, beyond what her just defence and the protection 
of her commerce required, we should then be justified in 
inquiring as to the destination of such force; and if a satis- 
factory explanation were not given, should have an un- 
doubted right to stop such preparations in limine; or if 
that should not be in our power, to recommence the 
war. Such in fact were the reasons assigned by the Bri- 
tish ministry for the renewal of hostilities in 1803 . 
Nor were they denied by our enemies to have been a 
legitimate cause of war, if they had been founded on 
sufficient facts. It was however afterwards explicitly 
admitted, in parliament, that no such armaments in the 
ports of France and Holland as had been alleged, 
had taken place ; and thus it appears, that during the two 
years of peace, no measures whatever had been adopted 
on the part of France to prepare that navy with which they 
were to overwhelm the fleets of Great Britain and to sub- 




73 

jugate the country. Yet we are continually stunned with 
the cry, that if peace be restored it will lay us at the mercy 
of France ; and this sentiment, as absurd as it is disgrace- 
ful, is now the efficient and operative cause of a war, which 
even those who support it acknowledge to be hurrying us 
rapidly on to our financial ruin, and which if continued, 
must infallibly produce those very consequences which 
these alarmists contemplate only from a state of peace. 

If reasons like those that have been alleged for the con- 
tinuance of the war, could be of any avail, what must we 
think of the conduct of those distinguished persons, who 
have of late years had the chief direction of the affairs of 
this country, and who may be supposed to be as good 
judges of its true policy as the advocates for a perpe- 
tual war? In 1801 , lord Sidmouth, lord Hawkesbury, and 
the administration with whom they acted, perceived no such 
objections to a pacification as the fears of the alarmists have 
now discovered. In the discussion between France and 
the same ministry in 1803 , no such cause of hostility was 
adverted to or suspected. In 1806 , his majesty’s govern- 
ment, under lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, was not pre- 
vented by considerations of this nature from negotiat- 
ing for a peace with France; and although such ne- 
gotiation failed, this failure is not to be attributed to 
any such vague and imaginary cause, but to our connexion 
with Russia, with whose demands France would not 
comply. Even his majesty’s present ministers, although 
not supposed to be particularly favourable to pacification, 
have acknowledged in the face of Europe, that there was 
no substantial cause for hostilities between France and this 
country, either from apprehensions of this, or of any other 
nature ; but that the war was continued on account of Rus- 

K 


74 


sia only, and that his majesty was contending for inte- 
rests not his own. Is it then possible that this alarming 
danger, which is to be the ground of perpetual war, was 
not foreseen by any of those eminent statesmen to whom 
the sovereign has successively intrusted the chief direc- 
tion of the public concerns ? Had the glances of the rattle- 
snake so stupified the senses of every administration, how- 
ever different in talents and opinions, that they were all 
eager alike to throw themselves into its jaws?* or were 
these discoveries reserved to be made by those, who hav- 
ing given up the reins of their judgment to the guidance 
of a terrified imagination, have endeavoured, and it must 
be owned not without success, to impress the country with 
the same unmanly fears that have agitated themselves ? 

It would be absurd to suppose that truths so important, 
and at the same time so evident, have escaped the obser- 
vation of others. In fact, the conviction of them is more 
generally diffused than the advocates for the war may be 
willing to allow. Nor is that conviction less felt because 
it has not been hitherto generally expressed. To pro- 
duce this silence many motives have concurred. Such 
have been, and such still are, the violence and the arro- 
gance of those who clamor for war, that the peaceable and 
considerate part of the community are deterred from the 
free and open expression of their opinions. Every allusion 
to the possibility of peace is regarded either as a proof of 
attachment to the cause of our enemies, or as a dastardly 

* “ It would seem as if our deadly enemy possessed, like the 
“ rattle-snake, whose destructive malignity and contortive pro- 
“ gress he imitates, the power of fascination >” See. Dangers of 

the Country , p. 72. 


75 


apprehension of their superiority. To imputations of this 
kind, however absurd or malicious, few persons choose to 
render themselves liable. The printing presses of the 
kingdom are almost all in continual requisition, ready to 
pour forth the united torrent of their abuse upon every in- 
dividual who has the courage to assert those opinions 
which may have a tendency to restore the general tran- 
quillity, and may thereby, perhaps, abridge those enormous 
emoluments which are now the reward of venality, ran- 
cor and abuse. But although these and other causes, con- 
nected with the various relations of private life, prevent 
the expression of the public sentiment, it is not on that ac- 
count less deeply felt. Even the difference of opinion 
which a few months since appeared in the county of York, 
and other places, where the question of peace or war was 
partially agitated, arose not from any diversity of idea as 
to the expediency of peace, but as to the best and most 
likely mode of obtaining it; and whilst some think that it 
ought to be sought for by addresses to the sovereign from 
every part of the country, others are of opinion that such 
measures may increase the demands of our enemies, and 
prevent our ministers from concluding a peace on as good 
terms as might otherwise be done. Of these two classes of 
people, the former may, perhaps, be the more obnoxious 
to a ministry intent on the prosecution of war, but the 
latter will in the result be found the more dissatisfied and 
the more irreconcilable. Suffering in silence, from day to 
day, the diminution of their comforts and the gradual 
ruin of their circumstances, yet persuading themselves 
that ministers will ere long perceive and endeavour to 
avert the dangers with which they are threatened, they 
wait with anxiety for the moment that may release them 
from their sufferings, and mav open to them once more a 


76 


free career for their industry. How long they will thus 
confide, depends upon the pressure of the weight they 
may have to bear; but if we may judge from recent indi- 
cations, it will not be long before a dutiful and loyal people 
will approach the throne of their sovereign, and whilst 
they assure him of their determined resolution to defend 
him against all his enemies, will intreat him to terminate, 
as soon as may be, a contest, the causes and objects of 
which are confessedly removed, and the result of which 
promises no advantages equal to the sacrifices which 
the further prosecution of it must unavoidably occasion. 

Notwithstanding the appearances of increased hostility 
between Great Britain and France, there is reason to hope 
that by a seasonable and temperate exposition of the views 
of the two countries, the foundation might be laid for that 
state of tranquillity which is so greatly the interest of both. 
Whatever may be the language of Bonaparte with respect 
to ships, colonies, and commerce, these are not the objects 
towards which his views will be directed. Much as he has 
already done, much yet remains to be done by him, even 
after the restoration of peace, to consolidate and secure his 
newly acquired dominions, to ascertain the relations and 
confirm the fidelity of his dependent states, and to lay the 
firm foundations of that monarchy of which he is ambi- 
tious to be the founder. If we interfere not with him in these 
occupations (and it has abundantly appeared that all oppo- 
sition on our part has only defeated its own object) he is 
not likely to entertain the absurd hope of rivalling that 
maritime superiority, of which if he were to attempt to de- 
prive us, his efforts would be as vain as ours have been to 
overturn his power on the continent. That this suppo- 
sition is well founded appears by the uniform tenor 


77 


of the last negotiation, in which this true and only basis of 
general tranquillity was repeatedly pointed out; and by the 
offer on the part of France, not only to surrender Hanover 
and Malta, but to relinquish to us her territories in the 
East Indies, to add to our possessions in the West, and to 
guarantee to us the Cape of Good Hope. If it had been 
the object of France to increase her maritime strength and 
her colonial territories, would her politic and long-sighted 
ruler have proposed to have surrendered her foreign pos- 
sessions to this country ? Or would he not, on the contrary, 
rather have grasped at those distant acquisitions, and have 
sought in the plunder of Holland and other countries to 
have added to the colonial possessions of France? In 
any negotiation in which he has as yet taken a part, 
it has not appeared that he was willing to disable him- 
self from the attainment of any object which he has 
deemed of sufficient importance to be insisted on ; 
and if he have proposed thus to add to our colonial and 
maritime strength, there is every reason to presume, 
however he may threaten, that he has no serious intention 
of contending with it. 

Happily however for this country, we have no occasion 
to place a reliance on his intentions, or to ask from him 
the concession of our naval superiority as a favour. If we 
be but true to ourselves, and do not wantonly sport with 
those blessings which Providence has conferred upon us; 
if, instead of blindly aiming at continental influence and 
connexions, we duly estimate our own interests, import- 
ance, and security, we may regard all the efforts of France 
to rival us, as a maritime power, without dismay. In a 
political point of view, Europe, since the commencement 
of the revolution in France, has changed her position. 
This country must, in some respects, change her position 


78 


also. Her connexions with the continent are, by her own 
act, dissolved. The balance of power, that chimerical source 
of war and bloodshed, now exists not even in name. Instead 
of devoting our exertions, exhausting our resources, and 
risking our very existence, in a fruitless and destructive con- 
test, let us turn our attention to those incalculable sources 
of prosperity and independence which have hitherto been so 
unaccountably and so fatally neglected. Let us attend more 
to ourselves and less to our neighbours; convinced that if 
we had devoted one tenth part of those immense sums 
which have been so lavishly expended in foreign subsidies 
and fruitless expeditions, in promoting the arts, the agri- 
culture, and the internal economy of the country, we 
should have raised ourselves to a justly merited eminence, 
and should have added to our real strength, importance, 
and respectability. Let us establish and consolidate, on 
principles of justice, humanity, and mutual interest, our 
foreign possessions and colonies, and adopt such a policy 
with respect to them as may give additional vigor to our 
manufactures, and additional employment to our com- 
merce. By a dignified, but just and conciliatory conduct to 
neutral states, let us dissipate the suspicions and animosi- 
ties to which we’ appear in some late instances to have 
given rise. * What would then be the proud situation of 
this country; standing on her own foundation, independent 
of foreign allies; extending herself by her commerce, on 
the one hand to the East, on the other to the West; herself 
the emporeum of the world? In this conduct we should 

* In the present critical and uncertain state of affairs between 
Great Britain and America, I forbear to touch upon them. The 
subject would of itself be of sufficient magnitude to form a 
separate publication. 


19 


find not only our interests but our safety, and be equally 
and at all times prepared for either peace or war. The 
increase of our commerce will be attended with an increase 
of the maritime strength of the state. Those apprehensions 
which operate so forcibly on the weak and timid, that 
France in the event of peace may rival us in our naval 
glory, will be effectually removed. We have now in our 
power the means of great national prosperity; with our 
manufactures at home, with our markets in the East and 
West Indies; with the imports from the colonies, and that 
intercourse with the rest of the world which these advan- 
tages will always command, who can contend with us? At 
the same time the instruments of our prosperity are the in- 
struments of our safety, and the increase of our navy the 
increase of our strength. This is the true position this the 
high destiny of our country; and nothing but a politi- 
cal SUICIDE, A TOTAL INCAPACITY TO MEET THE BOUN- 
TIES OF PROVIDENCE AND TO IMPROVE ITS BLESSINGS, 
CAN INDUCE US TO HESITATE FOR A MOMENT, AS TO THE 
COURSE WE OUGHT TO PURSUE. 


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